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THE ESTATE AND GIFT TAX REVISIONS OF THE
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976
HowARw ZARITSKY*
The Federal estate tax was adopted in 1916,1 amidst echoes of a
presidential call for
a progressive tax on all fortunes beyond a certain amount ei-
ther given in life or devised or bequeathed upon death to any
individual - a tax so framed as to put it out of the power of
the owner of one of these enormous fortunes to hand on more
than a certain amount to any one individual.'
Since its enactment, the estate tax has been continually revised and
restructured in an effort to make it a more effective means of wealth
redistribution and revenue gain.'
* Attorney, Arlington, Va.; Legislative Attorney for the American Law Division
of the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. B.A., Emory University,
1970; J.D., Stetson University College of Law, 1973; LL.M. (Taxation), Georgetown
University Law Center, 1976. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author
and do not necessarily represent the opinions of the Congressional Research Service
or the Library of Congress.
' Int. Rev. Code of 1916, ch. 483, §§ 200-12, 39 Stat. 756, 777. This was the origin
of the modem estate tax. However, a stamp tax was levied on receipts through inheri-
tance in 1797. Act of July 6, 1797, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 527. In 1862, Congress levied an
inheritance tax to support the Civil War effort. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 110, 12
Stat. 432, 479. The ill-fated income tax act of 1894 even included in "income" amounts
received by inheritance. Tariff of 1894, ch. 349, § 28, 28 Stat. 509, 553. The Spanish-
American War was also funded through an estate tax. Act of June 13, 1898, ch. 448, §
29, 30 Stat. 448, 464. This last tax was significant in that the United States Supreme
Court specifically upheld its validity, giving sanction to the modem estate tax which
would be enacted 18 years later. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900).
2 Speech by President Theodore Roosevelt, April, 1906, quoted in R. PAUL, TAXA-
TION IN THE UNrrED STATES 88 (1954).
Briefly, the estate tax was adopted in 1916 and suffered only minor revisions
between 1916 and 1932. In 1932, the gift tax was added to prevent the inter vivos
disposition of assets in evasion of the estate tax. Between 1932 and 1941, the rates
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Prior to the recent revision, the estate and gift taxes were sepa-
rate, complementary taxes, both graduated and both designed to
raise revenues and prevent the perpetuation of large estates. The
estate tax was imposed on the fair market value of all property or
interests in property possessed by the decedent on the date of his or
her death,' reduced by certain credits, exemptions and deductions.
Foremost among these were the specific exemption of $60,000 worth
of property5 and the marital deduction for certain properties passing
to a surviving spouse! The gift tax, enacted in 1932, was an effort to
curtail avoidance of estate taxes through inter vivos dispositions.
7
While the gift tax was intended to complement the estate tax, its
rates were set at three-quarters of the estate tax rates.8
The current effort towards estate and gift tax reform began in the
House Committee on Ways and Means in 1969.1 Four years later, the
effort was begun anew,"0 resulting in consideration of an estate and
gift tax reform bill in 1976 by the House of Representatives.,' This
were changed but no structural modifications took place. In 1942, the current format
was adopted, with the specific exemption of $60,000 and the rudimentary beginnings
of the marital deduction, designed to equalize the treatment of estates in community
property and common law states. See Int. Rev. Code of 1916, ch. 483, §§ 200-12, 39
Stat. 756, 777; Int. Rev. Code of 1917, ch. 154, §§ 300-01, 39 Stat. 1000, 1002; War
Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, §§ 900-01, 40 Stat. 300, 324; Int. Rev. Code of 1918, ch.
18, §§ 400-10, 40 Stat. 1057, 1095 (1919); nt. Rev. Code of 1921, ch. 136, §§ 400-11, 42
Stat. 227, 277; Int. Rev. Code of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 300-24, 43 Stat. 253, 303; Int. Rev.
Code of 1926, ch. 27, §§ 300-25, 44 Stat. 9, 69; Int. Rev. Code of 1932, ch. 209, §§ 401-
03, 47 Stat. 169, 243; Int. Rev. Code of 1934, ch. 277, §§ 401-06, 48 Stat. 680, 752; Int.
Rev. Code of 1935, ch. 829, §§ 201-03, 49 Stat. 1014, 1021; Int. Rev. Code of 1941, ch.
412, §§ 401-02, 55 Stat. 687, 704; Int. Rev. Code of 1942, ch. 619, §§ 401-58, 56 Stat.
798, 941.
I.R.C. §§ 2031, 2033 [hereinafter cited as Code]. The past tense is applicable
to this statement because, under the Tax Reform Act of 1976, some properties are
included in the gross estate at other than their fair market values. See discussion of
tax relief for small businesses and family farms, text accompanying notes 122-174
infra.
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 2052, 68A Stat. 389 (repealed 1976).
6 I.R.C. § 2056 (originally enacted as Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 2056, 68A
Stat. 392).
S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1932).
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 2502, 68A Stat. 403 (current version at I.R.C.
§ 2502).
Hearings on Tax Reform Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., 3970-4185 (1969).
10 Panel Discussions on General Tax Reform Before the House Committee on
Ways and Means, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Panel 10 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Panel
Discussions].
" H.R. 14844, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 14844]; H.
R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as House Report].
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bill eventually became the basis for the estate and gift tax title of'the
Tax Reform Act of 1976,12 passed by Congress on September 16,
1976,11 and signed into law on October 4, 1976. The estate and gift
tax revision of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 is a new set of ground rules
for estate planners and tax practitioners, as well as for taxpayers.
Each provision must be examined in order to develop a clear under-
standing of the new structure.
Unification of the Estate and Gift Tax Rate Schedules and the
Unified Transfer Tax Credit
Historically, the estate tax has been imposed on transfers at death
and the gift tax on transfers during life, and each has had its own rate
schedules and exemptions. The estate tax rates ranged from 3 percent
on taxable estates of up to $5,000 to 77 percent on taxable estates over
$10 million." The estate tax exemption was set at $60,000.11 The gift
11 Pub. L. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1525 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Act].
13 H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), was first reported out of the House
Committee on Ways and Means without an estate and gift tax provision. H. R. REP.
No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). After its consideration of the bill, the Senate
Finance Committee reported it to the floor of the Senate with a title dealing with estate
and gift tax reform. S. REP. No. 938, Pt. II, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-23 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Report]. The Conference Committee on H.R. 10612 com-
pared the Senate Finance Committee package with the separate bill reported out of
the House Ways and Means Committee, H.R. 14844, and adopted the House version
with only minor changes. H. R. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 552-625 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Conference Report]. Congress passed the bill on September 16,
1976. The House passed it by a vote of 383 yeas to 26 nays, and the Senate passed it
by a vote of 84 yeas to 2 nays. 122 CONG. REc. H. 10225, S. 16029 (1976).
" Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 2001, 68A Stat. 373 (current version at I.R.C.
§ 2001).
11 See note 5 supra. The exemption was set at $50,000 in the original estate tax of
1916. Int. Rev. Code of 1916, ch. 483, § 203, 39 Stat. 778. In 1926, the exemption was
increased to $100,000, and an 80 percent credit was provided for state death taxes paid
on the same property. Int. Rev. Code of 1926, ch. 27, §§ 301(b), 303(a), 44 Stat. 70,
73. In 1932, an additional estate tax was levied on top of the old tax, with a credit set
at $50,000. This was done to limit the use of the 80 percent state death tax credit to
the taxes imposed under the 1926 rate schedules. Int. Rev. Code of 1932, ch. 209, §
401, 47 Stat. 243. In 1942, however, the exemption on the additional tax was set at
$60,000. Int. Rev. Code of 1942, ch. 619, § 414, 56 Stat. 951. In 1954, with the codifica-
tion of the current Internal Revenue Code, the two sets of estate tax rates were unified
into one rate schedule, and the exemption of $60,000 was retained. Int. Rev. Code of
1954, ch. 736, §§ 2001, 2052, 68A Stat. 373-74, 389. The apparent.rationale for the
exemption from 1916 to the present was to assure the application of the estate tax to
only larger estates, although this has not been clearly defined in legislative documents.
See C. LowNDEs, R. KRAMER & J. McCoRD, FEDERAL ESTATE mD GiFr TAXES 9 (3d ed.
1974) and Surrey & Kurtz, Reform of Death and Gift Taxes: The 1969 Treasury Propos-
als, the Criticisms, and a Rebuttal, 70 COLuM. L. Rxv. 1365, 1366-68 (1970).
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tax rates ranged from 2 1/4 percent on taxable gifts up to $5,000 to
57 3/4 percent on taxable gifts above $10 million." The first $3,000
worth of gifts to each donee annually was exempted from tax,17 as was
an additional lifetime $30,000 worth of gifts." In addition to the sepa-
ration of the two rate schedules and exemptions, the division was
bolstered by disregard of lifetime transfers when computing the es-
tate tax. Thus, an individual could make a large number ofboth inter
vivos gifts and utilize the progressive nature of both rate schedules if
he or she had sufficient wealth to afford this practice. 9 A third aspect
of the independence of the estate and gift taxes was the exclusion of
an amount paid in gift taxes from the estate of the donor when the
property was included in the gross estate. This problem could arise
if the gift was found to be incomplete because the donor retained
beneficial control over the enjoyment of the property, or because it
was found to be in contemplation of death .
2
The independence of the two taxes was perceived as creating dif-
ficulties in administration and inequity in application, resulting in a
proposal for the unification of both the rate schedules and exemp-
tions by the Department of the Treasury in 1969.21 The Secretary of
the Treasury recommended to the House Committee on Ways and
Means that the rate schedules be integrated into one single schedule,
with rates ranging from 3 percent on taxable transfers up to $5,000
to 65 percent on taxable transfers about $10 million.? He also recom-
mended the creation of an "overall exemption" of $60,000 to replace
both the lifetime gift tax exemption and estate tax exemption.2 The
IS See note 8 supra.
1 I.R.C. § 2503(b). As this was a "per donee" exclusion, there was no limitation
on the total amount of gifts which could be made without tax. If a donor made 100
gifts of $3,000 to 100 different donees in the same taxable year, the entire $300,000 in
transfers would be exempt from tax.
SInt. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 2521, 68A Stat. 410 (repealed 1976).
" Several exceptions to the general disregard of inter vivos gifts in computing the
estate tax were gifts in contemplation of death, transfers with a retained life estate,
transfers taking effect upon the decedent's death, and revocable transfers. Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, ch. 736, §§ 2035-2038, 68A Stat. 381-84 (current version atI.R.C. §§ 2035-
2038). In these cases, the value of an inter vivos gift is brought back into the gross
estate for imposition of an estate tax.
" While the gift tax paid is allowed as a credit against the estate tax, the savings
arise because when the property transferred in gift is returned to the gross estate, it is
returned net of the gift tax paid, thereby reducing the total taxed transfer.
22 HousE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS AND THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANcE,
91ST CONG., 1ST SEss., TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS OF THE U.S. TREASURY
DEPARTMENT 354-55 (Comm. Print 1969) [hereinafter cited as Treasury Proposals].
2 Id. at 31, 356.
2 Id. at 357.
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proposed rate schedule would have been applied against the total,
grossed-up value of all lifetime and testamentary transfers. 4 In this
fashion, the incentive to make lifetime gifts to avoid estate taxes
would be reduced.n Furthermore, gifts with retained beneficial enjoy-
ment would not be taxable until the beneficial enjoyment had been
surrendered or, at the grantor's election, at the initial transfer.
6
The Treasury proposals had a marked influence upon the Con-
gress when it considered estate and gift tax revision in later years.
Also leaving a significant mark on the legislative thoughts on estate
and gift tax unification was the American Law Institute's findings
and recommendations.Y
In spite of extensive study of the relative merits of unification and
dual tax structure, the Institute could make no recommendations as
to the need for unification.2 It did, however, make recommendations
to be considered in case unification was adopted. First, the Institute
suggested that the tax base would not be the grossed-up total of all
gifts made during the life of the grantor, but rather, the estate tax
portion of the unified tax would apply independently of the gift tax
portidn.? The only grossing-up would occur as to gifts made within
two years of the death of the donor, which would be included in
measurement of the rates applied to the estate.? Second, the Insti-
tute felt that it was important that no property be included in both
the inter vivos and testamentary transfers." As such, it proposed a
series of rules to assure that all gifts were treated as either inter vivos
or testamentary. 32 The Institute also recommended the creation of a
unified tax exemption of $100,000 in order to permit smaller estates
to avoid high tax burdens.?This was also intended to reflect the
2, Id. at 355. For example, if G made taxable gifts of $50,000 in 1980, $100,000 in
1981, and died with a taxable estate of $250,000 in 1982, the first gift (assuming no
prior taxable transfers) would be taxed at the rates applicable to transfers up to
$50,000. The second gift would be taxed at the rates for transfers between $50,000 and
$150,000. The estate would be taxed at the rate for transfers between $150,000 and
$400,000.
2 Id.
21 Id. at 364-65.
AMERICAN LAW NSTITrrTE, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION; RECOMMENDA-
TIONS OF THE AMERICAN LAW INsTITurE AND REPoRTER's STUDIES (1968) [hereinafter cited
as ALI Proposals].
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 9, 45.
'Id.
21 Id. at 45-46. As such, the line between completed and uncompleted gifts was to
be made more definite. This was recommended for either unified or dual tax systems.
2 Id. at 46-47.
3 Id. at 9, 49-50.
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impact of inflation on the current exemption levels set in 1942.3
The new unified estate and gift tax schedules and the unified
transfer tax credit adopted in the Tax Reform Act of 1976 show the
impact of both the Treasury and Institute proposals. The basic sched-
ule adopted is progressive, with rates ranging from 18 percent on
taxable transfers up to $10,000 to 70 percent on taxable transfers
above $5 million.5 The new unified transfer tax is based on the total,
grossed-up lifetime and deathtime transfers of the taxpayer.3 6
Whether an inter vivos transfer has been made will still be deter-
mined under pre-1976 rules, but any transfer included in the lifetime
tax base will not be included again upon death. 37 This will insure
against double taxation of the same transfer, as might occur with
incompleted gifts.38 Gifts in contemplation of death will still be in-
cluded in the estate of the decedent,3 9 although the rules for such
inclusion have been changed.
Formerly, where a gift was made within three years of the date of
the decedent's death, a rebuttable presumption existed that it was
transferred in contemplation of death, and its value was included in
the gross estate absent evidence by the estate that the transfer was
not in contemplation of death."° The new law removes the presump-
tion, simply including in the estate of a decendent the value of all
gifts made within three years of the date of a decedent's death." In
addition, the new rules bring the property transferred in contempla-
tion of death back into the estate without first reducing them by the
gift taxes paid.42 This is in contrast with the prior law which
brought gifts in contemplation of death into the estate net of gift
taxes paid.
m Id. at 49-50. In 1942, when the pre-1976 exemption levels were established, only
one percent of all estates were brought within the ambit of the estate tax. By 1975,
however, seven percent of all estates were being subject to tax. House Report, supra
note 11, at 5.
" I.R.C. § 2001(c) (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2001(a)(1)). This schedule only
applies to residents and citizens. Another schedule is used for nonresident alien dece-
dents or donors with rates between 6 percent on taxable transfers up to $100,000 to 30
percent on taxable transfers in excess of $2 million. I.R.C. § 2101, (added by Act, supra
note 12, § 2101(c)(1)(D)).
u I.R.C. § 2001(b) (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2001(a)(1)).
3 House Report, supra note 11, at 12.
1 This would appear to be a response to the ALI Proposals discussed earlier. See
text accompanying notes 27-34 supra.
31 I.R.C. § 2035 (amended by Act, supra note 12, § 2001(a)(5)).
4 I.R.C. § 2035(a), (b) (amended by Act, supra note 12, § 2001(a)(5)).
"Id.
42 I.R.C. § 2035(c) (amended by Act, supra note 12, § 2001(a)(5)).
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In the case of a husband and wife who make a joint gift to take
advantage of the gift-splitting provisions of the law,4" the tax paid by
the surviving spouse will be allowed as an offset to the transfer tax
of the deceased spouse if the gift is brought into the estate because it
is incomplete." This is designed to neutralize the treatment of the
surviving spouse as the donor of one-half of the gift."5
Gifts made before December 31, 1976, are taken into account for
the determination of the transfer tax rate, as part of the grossed-up
total of all lifetime gifts." The new rules for gifts in contemplation of
death also apply to transfers made after December 31, 1976.11
In addition to unification of the estate and gift tax schedules, the
Tax Reform Act of 1976 also unified the lifetime gift tax exemption
and the estate tax exemption into a single tax credit." When fully
phased-in, in 1981, the credit will be $47,000. Until then, it will begin
at $30,000 for estates and gifts in 1977 and increase to $34,000 in 1978,
$38,000 in 1979, and $42,500 in 1980.11 The taxable estate of a dece-
dent dying in 1982, after full phase-in of the unified transfer tax
credit, will not have to file an estate tax return if it has sufficient
credit to cover its tax liability.4
For gifts made after September 8, 1976, and before December 31,
1976, a taxpayer will still be able to utilize any portion of his or her
lifetime gift tax exemption remaining. However, any portion of the
gift tax exemption utilized before the end of 1976 will reduce the
remaining unified tax credit for 1977 by 20 percent of the exemption
utilized.51 For example, if a taxpayer had his or her entire $30,000
lifetime gift tax exemption intact and made a taxable gift which
utilized the entire exemption, $6,000 of the $30,000 unified credit for
1977 would not be available. That individual's credit for 1977 would
only be $24,000.
" I.R.C. § 2513.
" I.R.C. § 2001(d) (amended by Act, supra note 12, § 2001(a)(1)).
House Report, supra note 11, at 13. However, there is no restoration of any
portion of the unified transfer tax credit used with respect to the gift brought back into
the estate. This presents the inequitible result of the reduction of the unified transfer
tax credit of the donor's spouse coupled with the inclusion of the gift in the donor's
gross estate, without concommittant increase in the spouse's credit.
" Act, supra note 12, § 2001(d)(2).
47 Id.
41 I.R.C. § 2010 (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2001(a) (2)); I.R.C. § 2505 (added
by Act, supra not 12, § 2001(b)(2)).
' Id.
I.R.C. § 6018(a) (amended by Act, supra note 12, § 2001(c)(1)(J)).
' I.R.C. § 2505(c) (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2001(b)(2)).
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The unification adopted by the Congress will remove most of the
tax incentives for lifetime giving. A taxpayer will still have his or her
annual $3,000 per donee exemption to utilize, and the gift taxes paid
on all gifts made over three years prior to date of death are, them-
selves, removed from the gross estate, but the major incentives for
such inter vivos dispositions have 'traditionally been the added
$30,000 exemption and the lower rates on gift taxes. This, in turn,
should produce a greater equity in the estate and gift tax field."
The use of inter vivos trusts should also decrease because of the
unification of the estate and gift tax schedules and creation of the
unified credit. In the past, these trusts have been convenient mecha-
nisms for removing assets from an individual's estate without entirely
disposing of control over the assets. However, with the unification of
the gift and estate tax, removal of an asset from one's estate will take
on minor significance. Indeed, the use of trusts for purely nontax
purposes may become the common situation rather than the rarity
that appears to have transpired until 1976.
While the gift in contemplation of death rules have been simpli-
fied, some criticism may be levied here against the reasoning which
led to their continuation at all. Since the estate and gift tax rates are
now the same and the transfer tax imposed at the date of death will
take into consideration the value of all inter vivos gifts, the incentive
for making gifts in contemplation of death in order to evade the estate
tax is reduced. It seems reasonable to assume that had Congress not
removed the presumption from the gift in contemplation of death
provisions, making them absolute, it would have been very difficult
for the Government ever to establish that a gift had been made in
contemplation of death because of the greatly diminished tax-
avoidance incentive. Witli very few exceptions, only a negligible tax
would be avoided. However, the impact of the new gift in contempla-
tion of death provision on a taxpayer who makes a gift for legitimate
reasons within three years of death will be minimal. Therefore, Con-
gress may be faulted for retaining the provision, but the significance
of the fault is minimal in relation to what appears to be a sound,
equitable change in the structure of the estate and gift tax laws.
52 Two commentators pointed out the gross inequities they perceived to arise from
the favoritism granted lifetime gifts by the estate and gift tax laws in effect before the
revision. "[Tihe present estate and gift tax system introduce[s] serious elements of
unfairness to smaller estates . . . and to those families unable to take advantage of
the three factors described above. The 1957-1959 data indicate that decedents with
large estates (over $1,000,000) had transferred 10% of assets during life; those with
small estates (under $300,000) had transferred less than 2% of assets." Surrey & Kurtz,
Reform of Death and Gift Taxes: The 1969 Treasury Proposals, The Criticisms, and a
Rebuttal, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1365, 1373 (1970).
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Marital Deduction and Fractional Interests
The marital deduction, enacted in 1948 in an effort to equalize the
estate tax treatment of decedents in common law and community
property states," has become the basic tool of estate planning. The
modification of the deduction under the Tax Reform Act of 1976
should result in a reduced burden of the tax on small- and moderate-
sized estates, without reducing its value to larger estates.
An estate is granted a deduction for the value of any property
passing to a surviving spouse, either under a will or by intestacy.4
Until 1976, however, the deduction was limited to the lesser of the
property passing to the surviving spouse or one-half of the adjusted
gross estate.5 The adjusted gross estate is the gross estate, less fu-
neral and estate administration expenses, losses and state death
taxes paid by the estate."
In order for property passing to the surviving spouse to qualify for
the marital deduction, it must be equivalent to absolute ownership.
Terminable interests and legal life estates, where not coupled with a
non-limited power of appointment, are not qualifying property for
purposes of the marital deduction. 57
In addition to the marital deduction for testamentary interspousal
transfers, another deduction is available against the gift tax for inter-
spousal inter vivos transfers. Prior to the 1976 revision, the gift tax
marital deduction was equal to the lesser of the entire gift, after the
allowable annual exclusion, or one-half of the gift, before deducting
the annual exclusion. 
5
Similarly, terminable interests given one spouse by another
spouse will not qualify for the marital deduction. This includes inter-
m Act of April 2, 1948, ch. 168, § 361, 62 Stat. 117. (I.R.C. § 2056) (amended 1976).
§ 361, 62 Stat. 117. (I.R.C. § 2056) (amended 1976). The Senate Finance Committee
noted that the purpose of the new marital deduction was to correct a disparity of
treatment between common law and community property states and, with respect to
the estate tax, "provide more nearly equal results ... " S. REP. No. 1013, Pt. I, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1948). As has been noted by some, however, "[a]bsolute parity
is, of course, impossible to achieve due to the essential differences in the iwo systems."
Young, Proposed Revisions of the Federal Estate and Gift Tax Laws: The ALI
Revisited, 5 GA. L. REv. 75, 82 n.58 (1970).
5' I.R.C. § 2056(a)(amended 1976).
I.R.C. § 2056(c)(1)(amended 1976).
" I.R.C. § 2056(c)(2)(amended 1976).
I.R.C. § 2056(b)(amended 1976).
I.R.C. § 2523. For example, if H gives W property valued at $25,000 in 1975,
the gift tax marital deducation will be the lesser of the full value of the gift after the
annual exclusion ($25,000 - $3,000, or $22,000), or one-half of the gift itself ($12,500).
The marital deduction would be $12,500, and the taxable gift would be $12,500.
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ests that terminate or fail after the passage of time or upon some
stated contingency, such as life estates, annuities, and estates for
years."
The Department of the Treasury and the American Law Institute
proposed nearly identical marital deduction revisions. Both sug-
gested the use of an unlimited marital deduction for inter vivos and
testamentary interspousal transfers." Both also expanded the base of
the marital deduction, including terminable interests in which the
surviving spouse or transferee spouse received beneficial enjoyment
of the property. Under both proposals, the tax would normally be
imposed when the beneficial enjoyment terminated, but could be
imposed at the time of transfer by election of the transferee spouse."
With respect to the gift tax marital deduction, both suggested that
the spouses be able to determine the relative proportions in which
they would like a jointly-made gift deemed made, rather than man-
datorily deeming it made equally. 2
The flexibility offered by the two estate and gift tax marital de-
duction proposals was touted as a strong point favoring their adop-
tion. Where a surviving spouse expected to consume the greatest
portion of an estate, either directly or by inter vivos gifts within his
or her annual and lifetime exclusions, the election could be made to
have no part of a terminable interest taxed on the transfer, but
rather, upon termination. In most cases, this could result in signifi-
cantly reduced estate taxes. In those instances where a surviving
spouse expected to increase the estate, terminable interests could be
used and taxed on transfer, removing the assets from the estate of the
surviving spouse." Another contention made by the two proposing
bodies was that this would relieve the burden of the estate tax on the
surviving spouses, who would receive the estate undiminished by
taxes.
The proposals had an impact on the considerations for estate and
gift tax revision, but an unlimited marital deduction was not
adopted. Rather, a hybrid deduction, possessing features of the un-
limited marital deduction and the limited deduction, was accepted
I.R.C. § 2523(b)(amended 1976).
,ALI Proposals, supra note 27, at 7-8, 32-33, 37-39; Treasury Proposals, supra
note 21, at 119, 357-60.
" ALI Proposals, supra note 27, at 7-8, 34-35; Treasury Proposals, supra note 21,
at 379.
,2 AL! Proposals, supra note 27, at 7-8, 37-39; Treasury Proposals, supra note 21,
at 380.
13 Treasury Proposals, supra note 21, at 349-60.
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by the House Committee on Ways and Means 4 and incorporated into
the Tax Reform Act of 1976.65
The new marital deduction for testamentary transfers sets an al-
ternative limitation on the estate tax deduction for property passing
to a surviving spouse. The deduction is limited to the greater of one-
half of the adjusted gross estate or $250,000.66 Furthermore, the gift
tax marital deduction is unlimited for the first $100,000 of gifts, but
with the second $100,000 of gifts fully taxed, and one-half of all gifts
above the $200,000 mark granted a deduction.67 To the extent the
marital deduction for inter vivos transfers exceeds one-half of the
value of the gift, that is, for part of the deduction for gifts under
$200,000, the estate tax marital deduction is subject to a dollar-for-
dollar reduction. 8
The new estate tax marital deduction applies to estates of dece-
dents dying after December 31, 1976.9 It was not intended that some
estates which had already been planned with formula marital deduc-
tion clauses be forced to leave more than intended to the surviving
spouse. For a decedent dying after December 31, 1976, but before
January 1, 1979, leaving a will written before January 1, 1977, and
not amended prior to date of death, containing a formula marital
deduction clause, the old rules shall apply if the statutory law of the
state does not construe the clause as being subject to the revised
federal marital deduction limitations. 7 The gift tax marital deduc-
tion limitations imposed by the new law will apply to all gifts made
after December 31, 1976.72
" House Report, supra note 11, at 17-18.
Act, supra note 12, § 2002(a)(1).
" I.R.C. § 2056(c)(1) (amended by Act, supra note 12, § 2002(a)(1)).
'7 I.R.C. § 2523(a)(2) (amended by Act, supra note 12, § 2002(b)).
" I.R.C. § 2056(c)(1)(B)(i) (amended by Act, supra note 12, § 2002(a)(1)).
*' Act, supra note 12, § 2002(d)(1).
,o House Report, supra note 11, at 18.
" Act, supra note 12, § 2002(d)(1)(B). For decedents whose wills do not use a
marital deduction formula clause, but leave one-half of their adjusted gross estates to
the surviving spouse and, because of the desire to maximize the marital deduction,
leave one-half of all assets eit!{er to the surviving spouse by terminable interest or to
others, action should be taken before date of death to amend the will. For example, if
a decedent intended to leave as much property to his or her surviving spouse as was
possible, utilizing maximum tax advantage, and if the adjusted gross estate was
$250,000, it is possible that without amendment the surviving spouse would take either
half the adjusted gross estate by conditional gift or that it would go to another person.
With amendment, he or she wouldbe able to take the entire estate without imposition
of tax.
n Act, supra note 12, § 2002(d)(2).
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A problem related to that of the marital deduction is the frac-
tional interest question. Under the estate tax law, the entire value of
the property owned jointly by a husband and wife is included in the
estate of the first spouse to die. If the surviving spouse can show that
he or she contributed part of the consideration, in money or money's
worth of goods or services, towards acquisition of the asset, the prop-
erty will be excluded from the decedent's estate to the extent of the
relative contributions.73
Under the gift tax law, the creation of a joint tenancy by a spouse
who has contributed the entire consideration towards acquisition of
the asset, constitutes a taxable gift if two conditions are met. First,
there must be a right of survivorship and, second, the right must not
be destructible, other than by mutual consent of the parties. 74 That
is to say, if the grantor can take the joint interest back, no gift has
actually been made.
If the property is placed in a joint tenancy with right of survivor-
ship, or a tenancy by the entireties, and if the gift is deemed taxable,
the amount of the gift is determined by comparing the total value of
the contribution made by the donor with the actuarially-determined
value of the donor's percentage interest in the property as a joint
owner.
75
One exception to the fractional interest rule occurs in gifts of real
property by one spouse to another. Where a joint tenancy with right
of survivorship is created by one spouse to another. Where a joint
tenancy with right of survivorship is created by one spouse, with the
spouse as joint tenant, and if the property is real estate, the donor
may elect whether the property shall be treated as transferred by
gift.76 If the donor takes no affirmative action, the transfer is treated
13 I.R.C. § 2040 (amended 1976).
7, I.R.C. § 2515 (amended 1976); Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-2(b) (1958).
Treas. Regs. §§ 25.2511-1(h)(5)(1958), 25.2515-2(b)(1) (1958). For example, "H
creates a tenancy by the entirety between himself and his wife, W, in certain common
stocks having a total fair market value of $50,000. At the time of the creation H is 44
years of age and W is 36 years of age. Under local law, H and W are each entitled to
one half of the income from the stocks held by the entirely. Since H is older than W
and has a shorter life expectancy, the value of his interest in the property is less than
W's because W has a greater possibility of surviving H and obtaining all of the property
outright. Table IX of the I.R.S. Publication No. 11, 'Actuarial Values for Estate and
Gift Tax,' shows that H's percentage interest in the stocks is .42577 and, consequently,
the value of the gift to W is .57423 times $50,000 or $28,711.50." Egan, Andrews,
Colson, Graven & Kahn, PROBLEMS OF FEDERAL TAXATION OF EsTATEs-GWrs-TRuSTS,
127-28 (1st ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as Problems of Federal Taxation].
" I.R.C. § 2515 (amended 1976). The rationale for electing to have the transaction
taxed as a gift relates to the treatment of termination of the tenancy. If the considera-
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as not being a gift, and not subject to gift tax. 7
The distinct treatments of the fractional interest situation for
estate and gift tax purposes raised serious problems with interspousal
tenancies. The gift tax could flow from the creation of a joint tenancy,
since that is determined by applicable local law. The property subject
to a gift tax, however, could also be subject to an estate tax because
that levy looked only to the relative contributions."' With respect to
this problem, only minor mitigation occurred by the credit given for
gift taxes paid on the prior levy.7
The American Law Institute addressed the fractional interest
question in their 1968 proposals, suggesting that the value of what is
received by a donee of a joint interest should be the value of the
fractional interest, regardless of applicable state law. Furthermore,
the Institute suggested that the amount of the joint interest trans-
ferred at the death of a joint owner be the fractional interest owned
at the date of death or the alternate valuation date, except where the
initial creation of the tenancy was subject to no gift tax." The ration-
ale of the Institute was that, if the transaction was treated as a
taxable gift, it would raise the rates at which the property would be
included and taxed in the gross estate.8 '
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 remedied this problem by providing
that one-half of the value of a qualified joint interest is included in
the gross estate of the first-deceasing spouse, regardless of relative
contributions. However, a qualified joint interest must have been
created by the decedent and his or her spouse, or either alone. In the
case of personal property, the gift must have been completed. In the
case of real estate, the donor must not have elected to have the
transfer treated as not being subject to gift tax. Finally, the decedent
and his or her spouse must have been joint tenants.
2
The impact of the new marital deduction and fractional interest
rules will be most felt by smaller and moderate estates. When cou-
tion for property held as tenants by the entirety was a gift for tax purposes, termination
results in a gift to one tenant to the extent that he or she receives an amount with
greater value than that of his or her proportionate interest. If the transfer was not
treated as a gift, on the other hand, termination creates a gift equal to the proceeds
received by the noncontributing spouse. Treas. Regs. § 25.2515-3. If the property is
expected to appreciate, it would be better to have the initial transfer taxed as a gift.
n I.R.C. § 2515(c) (amended 1976).
11 House Report, supra note 11, at 19.
71 Id.
ALI Proposals, supra note 27, at 14-15.
Id. at 13-14.
A2 I.R.C. §§ 2515, 2040, (amended by Act, supra note 12, § 2002(b)).
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pled with the new, unified transfer tax credit, the marital deduction
limitations will permit a decedent dying in 1982 and leaving a surviv-
ing spouse, to pass up to $425,000 worth of assets without imposition
of an estate tax. That is to say, by utilizing the $250,000 marital
deduction, an adjusted gross estate of $425,000 may be reduced to a
taxable estate of only $175,000. The $47,000 unified transfer tax
credit will eliminate any liability on an estate of $175,000. If inter
vivos interspousal transfers of $100,000 have been made, a total of
$475,000 can be transferred without tax since the $100,000 gift tax
marital deduction will only result in a $50,000 reduction in the estate
tax marital deduction. In fact, no return'would have to be filed on
an adjusted gross estate of $425,000, which maximized its marital
deduction and had not exhausted any of its transfer tax credit.M
The new marital deduction limitations will have limited effect on
larger estates. The retention of the alternative limitation of one-half
of the adjusted gross estate will continue to permit estate planning
for estates in excess of the tax-free marks, and the standard formula
marital deduction clauses will continue to be valid tools for these
estates.4
The policy behind the new marital deduction limitation should
also be examined. First, it will clearly serve to reduce the percentage
of all estates which are subject to estate tax. This will assist in return-
ing the estate tax to its basis in preventing perpetuation of very large
estates, and its inapplicability to small or moderate estates.,
Another argument which has been raised with respect to the liber-
alization of the marital deduction limits, is that some family mem-
bers are frequently shortchanged in order to maximize the marital
deduction. When the marital deduction is given a flat base, the po-
tential for distortion of natural giving patterns would be increased,
the argument continues.8 However, as one commentator has rea-
soned, in small and medium estates, it is most common for the bulk
of the estate to pass to the surviving spouse in any event, minimizing
" I.R.C. § 6018(a), (amended by Act, supra note 12, § 2001(c)(1)(J)).
Standard estate planning with the marital deduction is an attempt to equalize
the two estates and to preclude any portion of the estate from being included in both
the taxable estates of the first and second deceasing spouses, resulting in double
taxation of the same assets.
"I Blum & Pedrick, The Reform School Approach to Estate and Gift Tax Revision,
51 TAXES 81, 84 (1973). As the expert contends, with tongue placed firmly in cheek,
"our existing estate and gift tax system ... encourages people to have large fami-
lies .... The marital deduction, in both the gift and estate tax, is an inducement to
marriage-and you know what happens in marriage. And the tax favoritism bestowed
on skip generation trusts surely invites the wealthy to become grandparents and great-
grandparents over and over again." Id. at 85-86.
" See, e.g., Seidman, Status of Federal Estate and Gift Tax Legislative Proposals,
51 TAXES 197, 198 (1973); Young, Proposed Revisions of the Federal Estate and Gift
Tax Laws: The ALI Revisited, 5 GA. L. REv. 75, 83 (1970).
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the potential for significant distortion in giving patterns.
The fractional interest rules should alleviate a severe inequity in
the estate and gift tax laws, resulting in occasions of double taxation
of the same transfers. Together with the new marital deduction limi-
tations, the portions of the estate and gift tax revisions of the Tax
Reform Act of 1976 directed at interspousal transfers would appear
to be one of the soundest legislative tax reforms in a long time. It
promotes equity, relieves the burden on small and moderate estates,
and does not appear to impose a significant additional burden on
anyone. Perhaps the only consideration which should be raised is that
the terminable interest problem, which was attacked in the Treasury
and American Law Institute proposals, was not attacked in the estate
and gift tax revision which became law. While this is an area which
could clearly stand reform, its absence should not diminish a signifi-
cant and seemingly wise change in the marital deduction and frac-
tional interest rules.
Basis of Inherited Properties
Of all the provisions of the estate and gift tax revision of the Tax
Reform Act of 1976, surely none will have as great an impact on tax
and estate planning as the imposition of a carryover basis on inher-
ited properties. The law formulated by Congress to cure what many
perceived as "the most serious defect in our federal tax structure
today" is, in many respects, an entirely workable solution to a prob-
lem of intense complexity.
Under prior law, the basis of property acquired from a decedent,
either by testate or intestate succession, was its fair market value on
the date of decedent's death, or the alternate valuation date. 9 Conse-
quently, no tax was imposed on appreciation in value attributable to
the holding period of a decedent."
In its 1969 proposals, the Department of the Treasury suggested
imposition of a combined carryover basis and tax on unrealized ap-
Kurtz & Surrey, Reform of Death and Gift Taxes: The 1969 Treasury Proposals,
The Criticisms, and a Rebuttal, 70 COLUM. L. Rav. 1365, 1395 (1970).
" Id. at 1381.
" I.R.C. § 1014 (amended 1976). This is also the valuation placed upon the asset
for estate tax purposes. I.R.C. § 2031 (amended 1976). As such, it was felt by some
that the failure to tax appreciation at date of death was a reasonable concomitant to
the estate taxation of the asset.
"* While an estate tax was imposed, the point made is that no income tax was
imposed. Furthermore, if the decedent acquired the asset in a nonrecognition transac-
tion, such as a like kind exchange, the unrealized appreciation could be attributable
to the holding periods of numerous taxpayers, not merely the decedent.
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preciation of assets held by a decedent on the date of his or her death.
The tax portion, equivalent to that which would have been imposed
had the decedent sold the asset immediately prior to the date of his
or her death, would have been reported on the last income tax return
of the decedent, and would have served as a deduction against the
gross estate.' For property subject to the tax, beneficiaries would
receive a fair market value basis, as under the pre-1976 law.2
Property passing to a charity or surviving spouse and $60,000 of
other assets, as well as household goods, were exempt from the tax
on unrealized appreciation. A carryover basis attached to assets pass-
ing to a beneficiary without the imposition of a tax on unrealized
appreciation.1
3
The principal argument against the Treasury's proposal was that
it was too "complicated and cumbersome."94 In its consideration of
the treatment of unrealized appreciation on the date of decedent's
death, this factor appears to have been of some concern to the Confer-
ence Committee, which adopted a provision altogether workable, in
light of the complexities of the tax law involved.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 requires individuals acquiring assets
by inheritance after December 31, 1976, to take a basis carried over
from the decedent. 5 The carryover basis provision could impose sig-
nificant problems on beneficiaries of decedents now living who might
have kept few records of their basis in an asset, or might not know
what their basis ever was. Consequently, all assets in the hands of
individuals which are also held by those individuals on the dates of
their deaths, after December 31, 1976, take as their basis their fair
market value on December 31, 1976.11
Rather than requiring all individuals to have their assets immedi-
ately appraised for their values on December 31, 1976, the law has
adopted a mandatory method of computing the fair market value of
an asset held on that date.
To determine the fair market value of an asset held on December
31, 1976, the relative number of days during which the asset was held
Treasury Proposals, supra note 21, at 334-36.
2 Id. at 336.
" Id. at 336-37.
' Young, Proposed Revision of the Federal Estate and Gift Tax Laws: The ALI
Revisited, 5 GA. L. Rav. 75, 93 (1970).
I.R.C. § 1014(d), (amended by Act, supra note 12, § 2005(a)(1)).
" I.R.C. § 1023, (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2005(a)(2)). This also applies to
properties acquired by a decedent after January 1, 1977, which has a basis computed
with reference to the basis of the transferred property, held on January 1, 1977.
Conference Report, supra note 13, at 612 or 1355.
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before and after that date must be compared, giving rise to a fraction.
This fraction is then used to reduce the appreciation over the life of
the asset, under an assumption of even appreciation in value, and the
appreciation attributable to the pre-1977 valuation changes of the
property is determined and added to the basis. 7
For example, if D held an asset at the date of his death, December
31, 1986, and he had acquired the asset on December 31, 1966, one-
half of the appreciation in value of the asset would be added to D's
cost basis" to determine the fair market value of the asset on Decem-
ber 31, 1976. If D had paid $50,000 and the asset is worth $550,000 in
1986, the basis carried over to the beneficiaries would be $300,000
($500,000 in appreciation, times 1/2 [the number of days after De-
cember 31, 1976 are only one-half of the number of days of total
holding] plus D's cost basis of $50,000 equals $300,000).
The fresh start applies to all property held by a decedent on
December 31, 1976, but marketable securities are to be valued for
their fresh start on the basis of normal valuation methods, rather
than by the ratio of post-December 31, 1976, holding period to total
holding period." For family farms and small businesses, if the alter-
native valuation is elected,"' it is to be used for the fresh start alter-
native valuation, but the alternate valuation date cannot be used.''
The law provides a number of exceptions and special rules for
different types of property to facilitate the administration of the car-
ryover basis requirement. First, the executor or administrator of the
estate may elect to exclude from carryover $10,000 in personal effects
and household goods.' 2 Where household goods and personal effects
'7 I.R.C. § 1023(h), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2005(a)(2)).
" I.R.C. § 1023(h)(2)(C), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2005(a)(2)). The cost
basis is the decedent's adjusted basis immediately prior to death, increased by all
adjustments for depreciation, depletion or amortization over decedent's holding pe-
riod, multipled by the fraction representing the ratio of the holding period after De-
cember 31, 1976, to the total holding period, and also all depreciation or depletion or
amortization adjustments after January 1, 1977.
" I.R.C. § 1023(h)(1), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2005(a)(2)). Stock and
securities are marketable if they are listed on a national, regional, city or foreign
exchange, or are regularly traded over-the-counter. Conference Report, supra note 13,
at 613 or 1356.
I0 I.R.C. § 1023(h)(2)(A)(ii), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2005(a)(2)). The
special valuation methods for family farms and small businesses are contained in new
Code § 2032A, discussed infra.
101 I.R.C. § 1023(h)(2)(A)(ii), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2005(a)(2)). How-
ever, the alternate valuation would probably not be elected for appreciated assets in
any event, since it would only act to increase the denominator of the fraction used in
setting the fresh start basis, thereby decreasing the carryover basis.
102 I.R.C. § 1023(b)(3), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2005(a)(2)). Personal
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are not subjected to the election, or are not covered by the $10,000
limitation on the election, for purposes of determining a loss on subse-
quent disposition by the beneficiary, they will be valued at their fair
market value on date of death.' 3 In addition, life insurance on the
decedent's life' 4 and certain items taxed as income on the decedent's
last return are not subject to the carryover rule. 05
In addition to the exemptions and fresh start rules, there are
adjustments made to the carryover basis for federal and state death
taxes attributable to the property, a flat $60,000 basis, and state
death taxes paid by the distributee. 8 The $60,000 basis adjustment
is allocated to all properties in relation to their adjusted bases, ad-
justed for purposes of the carryover rules.' 7 It cannot, however, be
used to increase the basis of an asset beyond its fair market value.' 8
Certain questions regarding the carryover basis are to be answered
by the Department of the Treasury in its regulations. These include
how to reflect capital improvements in the fresh start computations
of basis, and when to deem a substantial improvement a separate
piece of property for basis purposes.' It is also intended that the
Treasury set forth allocations of basis rules when the property is
treated, in part, as taxable income under other sections of the Code,
such as those dealing with income in respect of a decedent."'
If a pecuniary bequest is satisfied with appreciated property, oth-
erwise subject to a carryover basis, gain will be recognized to the
estate. This gain, however, is limited to the extent to which the fair
market value at the time of the transfer in satisfaction of the bequest,
considered an exchange for income tax purposes, exceeds the estate
tax valuation of the asset."' A similar rule applies to trust disposi-
and household goods include clothes, furniture, sporting goods, jewelry, stamp and
coin collections, silverware, china, crystal, cooking utensils, books, televisions, cars,
radios, and similar items. House Report, supra note 11, at 38.
'" I.R.C. § 1023(a)(2), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2005 (a)(2)). This is similar
to the treatment currently afforded property acquired by gift. Code § 1015(a).
' I.R.C. § 1023(b)(2)(B), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2005(a)(2)).
,GI I.R.C. § 1023(b)(2), (added byAct, supra note 12, § 2005(a)(2)). The properties
excluded include income in respect of a decedent, joint and survivor annuities under
which the survivor is taxable, and payments from a deferred compensation plan which
are taxable to the distributee, property included in the gross estate as a gift in contem-
plation of death, revocable transfer or power of appointment, and certain stock options.
"I I.R.C. § 1023(c), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2005(a)(2)).
" I.R.C. § 1023(d), (added by Act, supra note 12 § 2005(a)(2)).
' I.R.C. § 1023(f)(1), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2005(a)(2)).
' Conference Report, supra note 13, at 612-13 or 1355-56.
Id. at 613 or 1356.
I.R.C. § 1040(a), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2005(b)).
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tions because of the death of the decedent."' The basis received by
the beneficiary of such a specific bequest or transfer is the carryover
basis increased by any recognized gain.
Each executor is required to furnish the Secretary of the Treasury,
or his delegate, such information with respect to the carryover basis
of property at date of death as is required in future regulations."3 He
is also required to furnish the beneficiary of the property a statement
in writing noting the adjusted basis of the asset."' Failure to furnish
the Secretary of the Treasury such information as may be required
is punishable by a penalty of $100 for each day of failure due to
reasonable cause and not willful neglect, subject to a total limitation
of $5,000."5 Failure to furnish a beneficiary the statements required,
if due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect, is punishable by a
$50 fine for each failure, subject to an overall limitation of $2,500."'
The carryover basis provisions apply to all gifts after December 31,
1976, and to all estates of decedents dying after-December 31, 1976.1
7
As enacted, the carryover basis provisions will have a significant
impact on estate planning and tax planning. Many individuals have
been holding assets with the expectation of an eventual stepped-up
basis at their death. These persons will either have to dispose of the
asset currently, realizing and recognizing taxable gain, or hold the
asset for disposition at death, leaving the gain to be recognized by
their beneficiaries. Among the factors which might weigh in this deci-
sion would be whether the current holder of the asset had a significant
capital loss carryover to be utilized, and the relative marginal tax
rates of the two individuals. Also considered would be the estate tax
and the gift tax, both of which would be imposed on the property.
This last factor should not play too heavy a part in the decision-
making process, however, since the new estate and gift tax revisions
unify and equalize these two impositions.
Another result of the carryover basis change is the neutralization
of the estate and gift tax in inter vivos giving patterns. The unifica-
tion of the two taxes and of the two tax exemptions into a unified
transfer tax credit, and the changes in the marital deduction, have
acted to discourage inter vivos giving, in the sense such discourage-
ment occurs when an incentive is removed. However, the impact of
" I.R.C. § 1040(b), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2005(b)).
" I.R.C. § 6039A(a), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2005(d)(1)).
" I.R.C. § 6039A(b), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2005(d)(1)).
"s I.R.C. § 6694(a), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2005(d)(2)).
' I.R.C. § 6694(b), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2005(d)(2)).
" Act, supra note 12, § 2005(f)(1), (2).
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the carryover basis change is to encourage inter vivos disposition of
assets which are expected to appreciate, since they could be subject
to a lower transfer tax and the eventual capital gains would be split
between the beneficiary and the transferor. Consequently, the total
incentives and disincentives for giving found in the new tax law will
tend to offset each other. This should make the estate and gift tax
law, and, to the extent the carryover basis is a factor, the income tax
law, far more tax-neutral with regard to lifetime giving than the
former estate and gift laws.
One frequent complaint about a carryover basis approach is that
it will result in beneficiaries being locked into keeping the assets they
receive, for fear of a large capital gains tax on the disposition of these
assets. This argument, however, holds little validity, inasmuch as the
actual evidence shows that the stepped-up basis at date of death
caused an entirely significant lock-in of assets as well. A study by the
Brookings Institution showed that three-fourths of the gains on stocks
are unrealized during the lifetime of the investor, being locked-in by
the stepped-up basis at the date of death."' One commentator has
referred to this as creating an almost "complete immobility of the
investments of older persons."" 9 Consequently, the argument that a
carryover basis will result in a lock-in of assets appears incomplete
at best and specious at worst.
While it is not really certain whether or not the problem of un-
taxed appreciation at the date of death is or was the "most serious
defect in our federal tax structure,"'' 0 it is clear that the change from
a fair market value basis, either stepped-up or stepped-down,' to a
carryover basis will constitute a significant factor in tax planning and
estate planning. It may free many older persons to make wiser invest-
ments of their capital, not bound by the.wait for a stepped-up basis
at date of death. Coupled with the generally well thought out format
of the carryover basis provision, this appears to be a workable and
reasonable solution to what was clearly a difficult problem of tax
policy.
"I DAVID, ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION 99 (1968).
119 Young, Proposed Revisions of the Federal Estate and Gift Tax Laws: The ALl
Revisited, 5 GA. L. REV. 75, 90 (1970).
' See note 88 supra.
2 The fair market value basis will raise the basis (stepped-up) if the property has
appreciated between the date of acquisition and date of death, and lower the basis of
property (stepped-down) which has depreciated in value between the date of acquisi-
tion and date of death.
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Liberalization of Payment Rules, Redemption of Stock to Pay Death
Taxes and Asset Valuation
During recent consideration of estate and gift tax reform, a num-
ber of organizations and individuals requested that the Congress con-
sider legislative measures to reduce the burden these taxes imposed
on family farms and small businesses.' 2 Traditionally, these enter-
prises have had difficulties meeting estate tax liabilities upon the
death of a principal owner because of their low liquidity. This has
resulted in the involuntary disposition of many such farms and busi-
nesses, although the family and surviving spouse might have desired
to continue operations. In response, Congress has taken three actions
in the Tax Reform Act of 1976: reduction of some of the valuation
problems which plagued small businesses and family farms, altera-
tion of the rules governing redemptions of stock to pay death taxes,
and liberalization of the deferred payment provisions of the estate tax
law.
Farms and small businesses are normally composed of many as-
sets, the largest of which is usually their real estate. When the princi-
pal owner of the business or farm dies, the real estate is included,
along with other assets in his or her gross estate at its fair market
value on the date of death, or alternate valuation date.'1 Among the
various factors which enters into the determination of fair market
value of the property is its "highest and best" use.
In some cases, the use of property for a farm or closely held busi-
ness is at its highest and best use. However, particularly where farm
land is located close to urban or commercial centers, or where a small
business is located in an urban or commercial center, the property
would be worth considerably more if it were converted to other uses.
In these instances, the land is valued as if it were converted to one of
these "higher or better" uses, raising the estate tax liability to a point
' See, e.g., Treasury Proposals, supra note 21, at 118; 1973 Panel Discussions,
supra note 10, at 74; Hearings on Federal Estate and Gift Taxes Before the House
Committee on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. H1, at 857-58, 860-920, 963-
1002 (1976); Hearings on Revision of Federal Estate Tax Before the Senate Finance
Committee, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 1-28, 36-85, 111-117 (1976).
"2 I.R.C. § 2031. The fair market value is defined as "the price at which the
property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither
being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge
of all relevant facts." Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1958).
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where these estates which traditionally lack liquidity may be forced
to discontinue business operations and sell off the assets of the farm
or small business.
This problem was perceived by the Department of the Treasury
when it prepared and presented its 1969 proposals. The Department
suggested a two-step approach to alleviating the burdens imposed on
family farms and small businesses. First, it would increase the mari-
tal deduction, permitting totally taxfree interspousal testamentary
dispositions. Second, it would liberalize the rules governing both re-
demptions to pay death taxes and extensions of time for payment of
estate taxes.1 1
The Treasury noted four rules governing the payment of estate
taxes by family farms and small businesses. First, the time for pay-
ment of estate taxes could be extended for up to ten years in the case
of undue hardship. 24 Second, the time for payment was automati-
cally extended for up to ten years if the estate contained a farm or
closely held business interest, the value of which exceeded either 35
percent of the gross estate or 50 percent of the taxable estate.'2 Third,
stock held by an estate could be redeemed to pay death taxes, funeral
or administration expenses, with favorable capital gains treatment,
if the stock constituted either 35 percent of the gross estate or 50
percent of the taxable estate. 2 Fourth, the interest rate on unpaid
estate taxes, deferred under one of the aforementioned extension pro-
in., Treasury Proposals, supra note 21, at 118. The Department noted that:
Estates which contain farms or closely held businesses sometimes
encounter difficulty in finding the cash needed to pay the Federal
taxes which become due shortly after death. This can result in differ-
ent disposition patterns than would have been selected had sufficient
cash been available to pay the Federal tax on the transfer at death.
These problems can be alleviated by permitting tax free interspousal
transfers and by easing rules for payment of taxes for estates consist-
ing largely of farms or closely held businesses.
Id. The reflection by the Treasury in the alteration of natural disposition patterns
evidences the general belief of that department that the estate tax laws, as other tax
laws, should be neutral factors in disposition determinations. This was also shown in
the decision of the Treasury to tax appreciation at date of death, eliminating the
perceived lock-in caused older taxpayers by the presumed stepped-up basis at date of
death. See text accompanying notes 118-119 supra.
"I Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 62, § 6161(a)(2), 68A Stat. 762, as amended by
Technical Amendments Act of 1958, P.L. 85-866, § 206(c), 72 Stat. 1684. The regula-
tions note that undue hardship requires a showing of significant financial losses if
payment is immediately required. Mere inconvenience is not sufficient. Treas. Reg. §
1.6161-1(b) (1960).
'2 Technical Amendments Act of 1958, P.L. 85-866, § 206(a), 72 Stat. 1681.
In Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 1, § 303, 68A Stat. 88.
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visions, was imposed at the then-rate of only four percent, contrasted
with the general rate of six percent on unpaid taxes.'2 The Depart-
ment proposed significant revision in each of the four provisions, but
primarily in the first three.
The extension of time for payment of estate taxes in situations of
undue hardship would have been amended to apply to the capital
gains tax imposed on unrealized appreciation in assets held by a
decedent on the date of his or her death.'2 This tax, it may be re-
called, was the Department of the Treasury's answer to the problem
of unrealized appreciation on date of death, and would have been the
equivalent of the income tax imposed had the decedent sold the asset
immediately prior to death.
2 9
The rules governing extension of time to pay estate taxes for fam-
ily farms and small businesses would have been significantly altered
under the suggested reforms. First, the requirement that the farm or
business comprise more than either 35 percent of the gross estate or
50 percent of the taxable estate would have been reduced. The new
rule would require only that the business or farm exceed 25 percent
of the taxable estate.3 ' In addition, the definition of a "closely held
business," which, for purposes of the extension, required that either
the decedent have a 20 percent interest or the enterprise have no more
than 10 shareholders or partners, would have been reduced to a single
requirement that there be no more than 15 partners or shareholders,
with no percentage ownership required. 3' This extension liberaliza-
tion would also have applied to the capital gains tax imposed on
unrealized appreciation at date of death.3 2 Further liberalization was
evident in that the District Director would not have been able to
require a bond of double the tax liability as a condition to granting
an extension where other satisfactory security was furnished.' =
I" Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 67, § 6601(b), 68A Stat. 817 as amended by Techni-
cal Amendments Act of 1958, P.L. 85-866, § 66(c), 72 Stat. 1658.
'2 Treasury Proposals, supra note 21, at 407.
I" See text accompanying notes 88-121 supra.
131 Treasury Proposals, supra note 21, at 404. This would apparently have benefit-
ted all family farm or closely held business estates of at least 25 percent farm or
business assets, but it would have especially benefitted those estates with greater
proportions of exemptions and deductions, which are often the smallest estates.
'13 Id. This would permit extensions of time for payment of estate taxes where the
business was more diffuse in ownership, or when one individyal controlled the business
himself or herself.
" Id. at 405.
'= Id. at 406. The executor would be relieved of personal liability during the
extension as well.
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The Treasury proposals also provided substantial revisions of the
law regarding redemptions of stock to pay death taxes, following the
changes in the rules governing extensions of time for payment of
estate taxes. First, the estate could qualify for capital gains treatment
on the redemption of its closely held business stock if the stock repre-
sented at least 25 percent of the taxable estate, rather than requiring
either more than 35 percent of the gross estate or 50 percent of the
taxable estate.'34 In addition, the definition of closely held stock
would follow the definition used in granting extensions of time for
payment of estate taxes.'35 A suggestion would also have permitted
the Secretary of the Treasury to set the interest rates for both overdue
income and estate taxes according to the fluctuations of the money
market.'38
The Congressional action taken on the subject of family farms and
small businesses in the estate and gift tax area clearly reflects the
impact of the 1969 Treasury Proposals, although these proposals were
not altogether adopted. Rather, the provisions adopted were, with
only minor changes, those suggested by the House Committee on
Ways and Means, which included revision of the rules for extending
time for payment of estate taxes and for redeeming stock to pay death
taxes, and relaxation of the valuation methods used on family farms
and small businesses.
The new extension of payment rules provide for three extensions,
rather than the two extensions found in the prior law. First, upon a
showing of "reasonable cause," and not the stricter, "undue hard-
ship" standard, an extension of up to ten years may be granted by
the Secretary or his delegate. 31 Second, the present provision permit-
ting automatic ten-year extensions of the time for paying estate taxes
where the family farm or small business comprises at least 35 percent
of the gross estate or 50 percent of the taxable estate is retained for
future use. 38 However, if the family farm or small business comprises
65 percent of the adjusted gross estate, a fifteen-year extension is
automatically available.
39
The fifteen-year extension permits a total deferral of any pay-
"' Id. at 406-07.
133 Id.
'l Id. at 409.
,31 I.R.C. § 6161A(a)(2), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2004(c)). The term
"reasonable cause" is to be interpreted as it is for the one-year extension provisions.
Conference Report, supra note 13, at 611 or 1354.
Iu Id.
,", I.R.C. § 6166, (amended by Act, supra note 12, § 2004(a)).
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ments for five years, along with ten equal payments thereafter.4 0 If
the estate is composed of a family farm, the percentage requirements
may be met by including in the value of the farm the residential
buildings housing either the owners or lessees of the farm, or their
employees whose occupation is tending the farm.'4 ' If the estate is
composed of a small business, the interest will qualify if decedent
held at least 20 percent of the stock or partnership interests, or if
there were no more than 15 shareholders or partners.' The valua-
tions used for either a family farm or small business will be those set
for estate tax purposes.'
The interest charged on deferred tax payments has also been
changed. In 1976 the interest rate on extended estate tax payments
was increased to seven percent, and the special lower rate for exten-
sions was removed in 1975.'11 The Tax Reform Act of 1976 reduces the
interest rate on unpaid estate taxes extended for the fifteen-year
period to four percent, while ordinary estate tax liabilities accrue at
the seven percent rate.4 5
To facilitate administration of estates, the new law also provides
a special lien procedure for payment of deferred estate taxes. The lien
attaches in favor of the Government on any property in the estate on
which tax payments are deferred for either ten or fifteen years. The
lien attaches to the extent of the deferred tax liability and interest,
and no greater lien can be used.'48 The property must also be expected
to survive the duration of the lien.'
In addition to the new rules for extension of time to pay estate tax
liabilities, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 also changes the rules for
redeeming stock at capital gains rates in order to pay death taxes.
Instead of the requirement that stock must comprise at least 35 per-
cent of the gross estate or 50 percent of the taxable estate, the new
law now requires only that the stock comprise at least 50 percent of
the adjusted gross estate. 8 Furthermore, where the estate elects to
"' I.R.C. § 6166(a), (amended by Act, supra note 12, § 2004(a)).
"' I.R.C. § 6166(a)(1), (amended by Act, supra note 12, § 2004(a)).
1 I.R.C. § 6166(b), (amended by Act, supra note 12, § 2004(a)).
"1 I.R.C. § 6166(b)(4), (amended byAct, supra note 12, § 2004(a)). This takes into
account the new alternate valuation methods for family farms and small businesses.
Pub. L. No. 93-695, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1975).
u I.R.C. § 6601(j), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2004(b)).
ha I.R.C. § 6324A(b)(2), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2004(d)(1)). This pre-
vents imposition of the double bond or a lien equivalent, which may be imposed under
current law.
I.R.C. § 5324A(b)(1)(A), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2004(d)(1)).
"' I.R.C. § 303(b)(2), (amended by Act, supra note 12, § 2004(e)(2)). The House
Committee on Ways and Means had proposed that the stock be required to comprise
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defer tax payment, it need not make the election to have stock re-
deemed until the final payment of tax is due.'49 However, if the re-
demption is made at any time after four years and ninety days past
the date of decedent's death, the only portion of the gain on the
redemption which receives capital gains treatment is the lesser of the
unpaid death taxes and administration expenses, or the expenses
paid within one year of the distribution.'10
To assure that the redemption is to be used to pay death taxes or
estate expenses, the new amendments only permit capital gains
treatment on a redemption to the extent an interest of a shareholder
is reduced, either directly or indirectly, through a binding obligation
to contribute towards the payment of debts, expenses or taxes of the
estate.'5 '
These changes are intended to assist estates with liquidity prob-
lems and high estate tax liabilities. They permit deferral of tax pay-
ments and facilitate the raising of capital through stock redemptions
in order to pay the tax liabilities. However, none of the aforemen-
tioned provisions actually assists the estate in reducing its tax liabil-
ity. This is accomplished by the new, alternative valuation provisions
of the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
Under the new provisions, an alternate valuation may be elected
for real estate devoted to farming or to a closely held business, and
included in the gross estate of a decedent. The alternative valuation
essentially includes the property in the estate at its value as a farm
or closely held business, rather than its highest and best use.
In order to elect the alternate valuation method, the estate must
meet six requirements. First, the decedent must have been either a
United States citizen or a resident alien.' 2 Second, the value of the
farm or closely held business assets, including both realty and person-
alty, included in the estate must amount to at least one-half of the
gross estate.'53 Third, the value of the farm or closely held business
at least 65 percent of the adjusted gross estate, but the Conference Committee reduced
this to 50 percent. House Report, supra note 11, at 35; Conference Report, supra note
13, at 621.
"Ig I.R.C. § 303(b)(1), (amended by Act, supra note 12, § 2004(e)(1)).
1-0 I.R.C. § 303(b)(4), (amended by Act, supra note 12, § 2004(e)(3)).
151 I.R.C. § 303(b)(3), (amended by Act, supra note 12, § 2004(e)(3)). Prior to this
amendment, the estate could have its stock redeemed even though another person,
prior to the decedent's death, had received the stock in transfer from the decedent. As
long as the stock was returned to the gross estate, because it was transferred in contem-
plation of death, for example, the individual could receive capital gains treatment on
the redemption.
' I.R.C. § 2032A(a)(1)(A), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2003(a)).
'= I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(1)(A), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2003(a)). This is the
ESTATE-AND GIFT TAX REVISIONS i
real estate must constitute at least one-fourth of the adjusted gross
estate.'54 Fourth, the property must pass to a qualified heir.'," Fifth,
the property must have been owned by the decedent or his or her
family for at least 5 of the last 8 years, and used as a farm or closely
held business for this period.'58 Finally, there must have been mate-
rial participation by the decedent or a member of his family in the
business or farm for 5 of the last 8 years of its operation.' 5 If all of
these requirements are met, the executor may elect to value the farm
or closely held business real estate under either of two special meth-
ods.
If the qualified real estate is a family farm,' 8 the value may be
determined by dividing the excess of the average annual gross cash
rental for comparable land'59 over the annual state and local real
estate taxes by the average annual effective interest rate for the new
Federal Land Bank loans.6 0 The computation figures are based on the
five most recent calendar years preceding the date of decedent's
death.'
6'
If there is no comparable property upon which to value a family
farm, or if the executor so elects, or if the property is used as a closely
only requirement which looks at both the realty and personalty of the farm or business.
All others look only to the real estate, perhaps because only the real estate may receive
the alternate valuation.
"I I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(1)(B), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2003(a)).
135 I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(1)(A)(ii), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2003(a)). A
"qualified heir" includes any member of the decedent's family who acquired the prop-
erty from the decedent. To constitute a "member of the family" of the decedent, for
purposes of the special valuation provisions, the beneficiary must be one of the dece-
dent's ancestors or lineal descendants, a lineal descendent of one of the decedent's
grandparents, decedent's spouse, and the spouse of another descendant of the dece-
dent. An adopted child will be considered in the same relationship as if the child had
been born of the decedent. I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(1), (2), (added by Act, supra note 12, §
2003(a)). Cf. I.R.C. § 2611, (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2006(a)).
' I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(2), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2003(a)).
" I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(1)(C)(ii), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2003(a)). The
determination of "material participation" will be made in a manner similar to that in
which "material participation" for self-employment taxes is determined under present
law. I.R.C. § 1402(a)(1). See House Report, supra note 11, at 23 n.1.
118 Qualified real property includes property located in the United States and used
as a farm, including a stock, dairy, poultry, fruit, furbearing animal, or truck farms,
or as a small business. I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(3), (4), (5) (added by Act, supra note 12,
§ 2003(a)).




380 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIV
held business and not as a farm, the value may be determined under
a multiple factor method. 6 2 Under the multiple factor method, the
real estate is valued by the executor using normal appraisal methods,
but considering five major factors, including the capitalization of the
income the property can reasonably be expected to yield as a family
farm or closely held business, capitalization of the fair rental value
of the land for farming or as a closely held business, the state's assess-
ment of the land for tax purposes (assuming the state assesses at
current use, rather than best or highest use), the comparable sales of
other properties of the same use and in the same geographical area if
far enough removed from a metropolitan center to assure accurate
valuation, and any other reasonable valuation factors."6 3
In order to use the special valuation methods, the property must
be used as a family farm or closely held business for 15 years following
the decedent's death, or until the qualifying heir dies. 1' If the prop-
erty is converted to another use,'65 or sold to a nonfamily member, the
estate tax benefits obtained through the special valuation method are
recaptured.' The recaptured amount will be the lesser of the tax
saved by use of the special valuation method, or the difference be-
tween the fair market value at disposition and the special valuation
of the asset at date of death."7 If the recapture event occurs within
ten years of the decedent's death, the entire tax savings will be recap-
tured. If, however, the event takes place between the tenth and fif-
teenth years, the recapture is phased-out on a monthly pro rata
basis. 6 8
A special lien is given the Government on all farm or closely held
"12 I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(7), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2003(a)).
" I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(8), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2003(a)).
"e I.R.C. § 2032A(c)(1), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2003(a)). If the property
passed jointly to two or more qualifying heirs, however, the death of one does not
relieve the other of his or her liability for the portion of the tax savings attributable to
his or her property. House Report, supra note 11, at 26.
I' I.R.C. § 2032A(c)(7), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2003(a)), notes that a
discontinuation is deemed to occur when the qualified property ceases to be used for
the purpose at which it was valued or there is no material participation by a qualified
heir during at least 3 of any 8 years after the decedent's death.
"I I.R.C. § 2032A(c)(1), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2003(a)). An involuntary
conversion of the property is not, of course, a disposition such as would invoke recap-
ture. There may, however, be partial dispositions invoking partial recaptures. House
Report, supra note 11, at 25-26.
" I.R.C. § 2032A(c) (2), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2003(a)). If the disposition
is by a sale or exchange between unrelated and disinterested parties, the sales price is
the fair market value. Id.
I" I.R.C. § 2032A(c)(3), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2003(a)).
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business property which is afforded the special valuation for estate
tax purposes.' The lien continues from the date of death to the
termination of 15 years after the date of death, the death of the
qualified heir, or the disposition or cessation of qualified use of the
property.
70
The election to use special valuation methods on farms and
closely held business real estate must be made with the estate tax
return, and must be signed by each person who has an interest in the
property.' The agreement evidences their consent to be subject to
the recapture provisions and their understanding of the required con-
tinued use. 72 The statute of limitations for assessment of deficiencies
and collection of the recapture does not begin to run until the Internal
Revenue Service has notice of the recapture event, and it runs for
three years thereafter.'73 In no event may the use of a special valua-
tion method for a farm or closely held business reduce the gross estate
of a decedent by more than $500,000.17
This trio of tax relief measures, the liberalized deferral of payment
provisions, easier redemption of stock to pay death taxes, and special
valuation methods, provides needed relief for the estate tax burdens
imposed on family farms and small businesses. If it has any single
weakness, it may be that the payment deferral and stock redemption
provisions are not especially keyed to nonliquidity, in an absolute
sense. It is conceivable, though not entirely probable, that an estate
could have one-half of its value in highly liquid assets and one-half
of its value in qualifying farm or business properties. In this situation,
a fifteen-year deferral of estate taxes would not appear warranted.
However, the probability of this situation occurring, as has been
noted, is slight, and should not detract from what is a sound revision
of the estate and gift tax laws to eliminate some of the unfair burdens
imposed on some estates by their own circumstances and the struc-
ture of the federal estate tax laws.
Generation Skipping Transfer Tax
In any consideration of tax reform, a balance must be struck be-
tween the needs for equity and simplicity. In few areas has this recon-
ciliation been more difficult than that of the generation skipping
"I I.R.C. § 6324B, (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2003(b)).
118 I.R.C. § 6324B(b), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2003(b)).
M I.R.C. § 2032A(d)(1), (added by Act, supra note 12; § 2003(a)).
172 House Report, supra note 11, at 27.
'1 I.R.C. § 2032A(f), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2003(a)).
"I I.R.C. § 2032A(a)(2), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2003(a)).
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transfer. An examination of the measure adopted in the Tax Reform
Act of 1976 to correct the perceived inequities of generation skipping
trusts shows, however, the complexity which is sometimes occasioned
by the search for tax equity.
Formerly, the federal estate and gift tax laws imposed no transfer
tax when one life tenant of a property interest was succeeded by
another or when the beneficial interest passed to a remainderman
upon the life tenant's death.7 5 Because no tax was imposed, a grantor
could establish a trust of long duration, limited only by the Rule
Against Perpetuities, permitting several generations of beneficiaries
to enjoy the income and corpus without payment of additional trans-
fer taxes. These trusts, and similar non-trust transfers,", are com-
monly known as "generation skipping" transfers.'
The problems raised by generation skipping transfers are typically
manifested when a grantor establishes a trust providing his or her
children with a life estate and their children with the remainder
interest.' The initial transfer will be subject to either an estate tax
or a gift tax, but the succession of the grantor's grandchildren to the
corpus would have gone untaxed prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
Furthermore, the interests of the life tenants could be bolstered to
include income rights, rights to invade limited amounts of corpus
75 The federal tax laws subject to estate taxes only property in which the decedent
had an interest "at the time of his death." I.R.C. § 2033. No estate tax was imposed
at the termination of a life estate under the theory that at his or her death, the
decedent's interest had lapsed and nothing existed which could be called an interest.
One commentator has noted that if the estate tax had an "analogue to the Clifford
doctrine which imposed a tax where there exists a substantial ownership," the problem
of generation skipping trusts would be cured because the life tenant would have the
value of that interest included in his or her gross estate. Oshins, Generation Skipping
Trusts, 38 NFv. ST. B.J. 10 n.3 (1973).
"7 Other transfers which, though not involving trusts, are considered generation
skipping include life estates, estates for years, and certain insurance and annuity
contracts. See House Report, suprx note 11, at 47.
I" The term "generation skipping" appears to have been coined by Gerald R.
Jantscher in 1967. Dr. Jantscher defined a "generation skipping" transfer as a disposi-
tion "in long lived trusts, . . . that permit members of successive generations to enjoy
beneficial interests without a transfer tax liability being generated when their interests
expire." G. JANTscHR, TRusTs AND ESTATE TAXATION 54 (1967). While Dr. Jantscher
appears to have coined the term "generation skipping," he was not the first to note
the problem. In 1954 Randolph Paul discussed the need for estate tax reform to curtail
tax avoidance through the use of life estates, the nontrust aspect of generation skip-
ping. R. PAuL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 540-42 (1954).
M Hereinafter, all generation skipping transfers will be referred to as "generation
skipping trusts," although it is recognized that many such transfers are not in the form
of trusts, but in other forms. See note 176 supra.
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annually for any reason, and rights to invade unlimited amounts of
corpus subject to an ascertainable standard relating to health, educa-
tion, support or maintenance.
The principal limitations on a grantor's ability to tie up property
in this fashion, prior to the new law, were the state and common law
rules against perpetuities and the tax laws regarding powers of ap-
pointment. The former, as normally construed, preclude creation of
a trust or other transfer of indefinite or extreme duration.' 9 The latter
includes in the gross estate of the beneficiary any interests which are
deemed to be a general power of appointment. 8 '
Under the Rule Against Perpetuities, a grantor may not create an
interest which is not sure to vest within twenty-one years of a life in
being at the time of the transfer.'8 ' In the case of a generation skip-
ping trust established by testamentary disposition, for example, the
life interest could pass to the children of the grantor and the remain-
der interest pass to their children who may survive. This transfer
would not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities. However, restric-
tions on the qualification of the grandchildren to receive the remain-
der interest could disqualify the transfer. For example, the Rule
Against Perpetuities would preclude the grantor's giving the life es-
tate to his or her children and the remainder interest to those grand-
children who may attain the age of 25 years. The Rule would be
violated because the interest of the beneficiaries in the remainder is
a class gift and, for purposes of the Rule, class gifts are not vested in
any member of the class until they are vested in all members of the
class.' 2 Because there may be grandchildren of the grantor who will
not attain the age of 25 years within twenty-one years of the death of
the grantor's children (the lives in being at the death of the grantor)
this transfer would violate the Rule and be void.
Another major limitation placed on generation skipping trusts by
the Rule Against Perpetuities is a limitation on the number of genera-
tions which may be skipped when the beneficiaries are classes. As
noted, no member of a class of beneficiaries is vested under the Rule
until all members of the class are vested, and this vesting must occur
within twenty-one years of the life or lives in being at the date of the
transfer. If a grantor transfers successive life interests to his children,
grandchildren, then to such great grandchildren as may survive, the
- GRAY, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (4th ed. 1942); 6 Am-ucAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 24.1 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as Casner].
IN I.R.C. § 2041.
"' See note 179 supra.
" Casner, supra note 179, at § 24.26.
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Rule will be violated because the class of great grandchildren will not
be vested until the death of all of the grantor's grandchildren. This
event need not occur within twenty-one years of the death of the
grantor's children.'1' Therefore, the Rule limits the number of genera-
tions which may be skipped in certain cases, as well as the conditions
which may be imposed upon receipt of beneficial interests.
The limitations imposed on generation skipping trusts by the es-
tate taxation of powers of appointment restricted the value and worth
of the interests enjoyed by life beneficiaries. When an individual dies
possessed of a general power of appointment, its value is included in
his or her gross estate.'8 4 Whether the power is considered general
under applicable state law or the instrument itself is not relevant.' 5
The tax law looks, rather, to the nature of the power itself. Any
interest affecting the beneficial enjoyment of the trust property by
the power to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate the trust instrument
or its terms is a general power of appointment for estate tax purposes,
and its value will be included in the decedent's gross estate."5 ' The
ambit of these rules, however, is as much determined by the excep-
tions as by the general rule.
Certain interests do not constitute a general power of appoint-
ment, although they may be substantial interests in the corpus of the
trust. These interests include a right to income,8 7 a power to invade
the corpus of the trust subject to an ascertainable standard relative
to health, education, support or maintenance,'u a power to draw
down annually from the corpus of the trust the greater of $5,000 or
five percentum of the corpus,'89 a power to manage the trust assets
for the benefit of the other beneficiaries,"10 and a power to appoint any
or all of the decedent's share to anyone, either by inter vivos or
testamentary disposition, as long as the interest may not be ap-
183 Id.
I.R.C. § 2041.
" Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(b)(1)(1958); Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78
(1940); Maytag v. United States, 493 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1974); First Virginia Bank v.
United States, 490 F.2d 532 (4th Cir. 1974); Keeter v. United States, 461 F.2d 714 (5th
Cir. 1972).
" Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(b)(1)(1958).
"8 Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-3(f)(Example 1)(1958).
' I.R.C. § 2041(b)(1)(A); Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(c)(2)(1958); see also Estate of
Effie Kells Jones, 56 T.C. 35 (1971), aff'd sub nom. Estate of Jones v. Commissioner,
Civil No. 71-2050 (3d Cir. Jan. 30, 1973), disposition recorded, 474 F.2d 1338, 32
A.F.T.R. 2d 73-6193 (3d Cir. 1973); Moore, The Tax Importance of Ascertainable
Standards in Estate Planning, 111 Ta. & EsT. 946, 998 (1972).
" I.R.C. § 2041(b)(2).
' Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(b)(1)(1958).
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pointed to the decedent, the decedent's estate, the decedent's credi-
tors or the creditors of the decedent's estate."' A power of appoint-
ment also is not considered general if it may be exercised only in
conjunction with the creator of the power or another person having a
substantial interest adverse to the exercise of the power in favor of
the decedent."' If the power is classified as a general power of ap-
pointment but is exercisable only in conjunction with another person
or persons, the estate of the decedent will include a ratable share of
the property subject to the power, computed as if the power had been
exercised in favor of all the beneficiaries equally.' 3
Under these rules, the life beneficiary may enjoy substantial bene-
ficial interests from the trust corpus without having its value in-
cluded in his or her gross estate. Because of the nature of these rights
a number of commentators have claimed that there exists a parity
between the position of a life beneficiary of such a trust and an
individual owning the trust res outright. Therefore, it is asserted,
there should be a parity in the tax treatment of the two situations.' 4
With regard to generation skipping trusts, the Tax Reform Act of
1976 brings such a parity to the tax laws.
The 1969 Treasury proposals based their generation skipping trust
tax on two policy beliefs. First, the law permitting generation skip-
ping trusts to go untaxed resulted in an "inequitable distribution of
the transfer tax" because only wealthy taxpayers could utilize the
generation skipping trust to avoid their taxes. Second, a transfer tax
was thought most equitably applied "with respect to each generation
regardless of whether that generation receives the property or is
skipped in favor of a succeeding generation.""19
5
The Treasury suggested imposition of an additional transfer tax
on the transfer of an interest, in trust, directly or indirectly, to a
person more than one generation below the beneficiary." ' The tax
liability would be an obligation of the trust, but would be computed
on the marginal or grossed-up rates of the beneficiary whose interest
was being terminated."' The tax would be imposed at a rate of sixty-
percent of the rate that the beneficiary would have paid had he or
"I I.R.C. § 2041(b)(1).
'" I.R.C. § 2041(b)(1)(C)(i), (ii).
I.R.C. § 2041(b)(1)(c)(iii).
' ALI Proposals, supra note 27, at 6-7, 28-29; G. JANTScHEM, TRusTs AND ESTATE
TAXATION 54-59 (1967); PECHmAN, FEDERAL TAX Poicy 192-93 (1966); Treasury Propos-
als, supra note 27, at 377-401; Oshins, Generation Skipping Trusts, 37 NEv. ST. B.J.
10, 11 (1973); and Westfall, Revitalizing the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, 83 HAaV.
L. REv. 986, 1006-1013 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Westfall].
Its Treasury Proposals, supra note 21, at 389.
"' Id. at 393.
I" Id. at 391.
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she made the transfer outright."8 The beneficiary could file an elec-
tion with the Internal Revenue Service and the trust immediately
would become liable for the transfer tax based on the marginal trans-
fer tax rate of the beneficiary in that year.'99 This would increase the
transfer taxes paid by the beneficiary on subsequent transfers be-
cause the integrated estate and gift tax table would compute tax on
a grossed-up lifetime basis."' Under no conditions, however, could
the tax be postponed beyond the date of death of the last beneficiary
to whom a gift or transfer would not be generation skipping."'
The American Law Institute, in their 1968 proposals, looked to a
tax on the transfers to individuals of different generations as well, but
excluded both outright transfers to individuals of different genera-
tions and trusts or transfers skipping only one generation.0 2 The im-
position on taxable generation skipping trusts would be computed on
the basis of the average rate applicable to transfers made by the
transferor during the taxable period.0 '
Both the House and Senate estate and gift tax reform proposals
imposed a tax on the transfer of beneficial interests in property to a
generation skipping heir by distribution or termination of the inter-
vening beneficiary's or deemed transferor's interest."4 In fact, it was
in this area of generation skipping trust taxation that the two houses
of Congress found, perhaps, their greatest general agreement on es-
tate and gift tax reform.
The new laws regarding generation skipping trusts define as cov-
ered transfers those providing for splitting the beneficial interest in
the trust res among beneficiaries of more.than one generation below
11 Id.
," Id. at 391-92.
Id. This proposal has been criticized by at least two authors as opening the door
to tax avoidance through use of nominal beneficiaries who are members of the skipped
generation in order to defer taxes on the subsequent beneficiaries. Westfall, supra note
194, at 1010; Note, Current Suggestions for Gift and Estate Tax Legislation, 30 TAx
L. REv. 451, 460 (1975).
201 Id.
"2ALI Proposals, supra note 27, at 28-29. The proposition that one level of benefi-
ciaries or generation be skipped without tax is based on the belief that simplicity is
more important than lost tax equity or revenues when only one generation is skipped.
This proposal was commended by at least one author. Westfall, supra note 194, at
1009-1011.
21ALI Proposals, supra note 27, at 29. The ALI acknowledged that this is an
arbitrary rate but reasoned that "too many variables are involved to calculate the
additional tax that is to be paid on the basis of how much property passed outright to
the successive takers whose limited interests invoke" the tax. Id.
2 I.R.C. § 2601, (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2006(a)).
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the grantor. ' Beneficiaries are assigned to generations either by
reference to common ancestors with the grantor or, where no family
relationship exists, by their relative ages."0 8
The generation skipping transfer tax is imposed on the passage of
both rights, including right to receive income or corpus or terminating
distributions, and powers, including the powers to alter or establish
beneficial enjoyment of corpus or income. 2 1 The tax is applied
whether the interests are assured or discretionary, as in the case of
"sprinkling" trusts.2 8 Limited powers of appointment permitting
only allocation of income or corpus among lineal descendants of the
grantor belonging to a generation younger than that of the individual
holding the power, however, are expressly excluded from the list of
taxable interests unless coupled with other rights or powers.2 ,
The tax is imposed at either the termination of an intervening
beneficiary's interest or a trust distribution of accounting income to
a younger generation beneficiary. A termination is taxable if it elimi-
nates an interest or power of a younger generation beneficiary in favor
of another younger generation beneficiary at least one generation
further removed from the grantor.2 1 If there is more than, one benefi-
2u I.R.C. § 2613(a), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2006(a)).
See also House Report, supra note 11, at 48; Senate Report, supra note 13, at 20.
2 I.R.C. § 2611(c), (added byAct, supra note 12, § 2006(a)). A beneficiary within
12 1/2 years of the grantor is deemed the same generation; 12 1/2 -37 1/2 years younger
is deemed one generation removed; each 25 years younger is deemed another genera-
tion removed.
- I.R.C. § 2613(d), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2006(a)); House Report, supra
note 11, at 48-49; Senate Report, supra note 13, at 21. While neither the power to draw
down an annual $5,000 or five percent of corpus nor the power to invade corpus subject
to an ascertainable standard of health, education, support or maintenance constitute
general powers of appointment under estate tax law, both constitute taxable powers
for purposes of the generation skipping transfer tax. House Report, supra note 11, at
49.
Id. Sprinkling trusts are trusts in which the trustee has discretion to allocate
the income and corpus among different beneficiaries (i.e., "sprinkling" the benefits of
the trust). Sprinkling trusts raise certain special problems in the area of terminations
of interest, as well as being generally covered as taxable interests under the generation
skipping trust provisions. See note 211 infra.
20 As noted in the report of the House Committee on Ways and Means, a trust
would not be a generation skipping trust merely because the grantor's child had a
power to allocate income among his or her children prior to their receiving the remain-
der interest. However, if the same child also had a right to income himself or herself,
the power would be taxable. House Report, supra note 11, at 49.
"I I.R.C. § 2613(b), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2006(a)); House Report, supra
note 11, at 50-52; Senate Report, supra note 13, at 21. A future interest not coupled
with a present interest does not result in a taxable event when terminated. This
prevents imposition of a tax on the termination of an interest which never became
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ciary in the same generation, there is no termination until all inter-
ests have been terminated."' If the taxable termination occurs at the
death of the deemed transferor, the alternate valuation date may be
elected by the person liable for the tax.
212
A distribution of trust accounting income to a younger generation
beneficiary, even without a termination of the deemed transferor's
interest, is a taxable transfer under the new rules.2 1 1 To prevent tax
avoidance, any distribution out of trust corpus while accounting in-
come exists at the time of the distribution will be deemed to be from
the income, rather than the corpus of the trust.
214
The tax on a generation skipping transfer is computed in a man-
ner intended to equate it with imposition of an estate tax on a similar
transfer outright at the deemed transferor's death."5 As such, the tax
base is the value of any money, property, or power or interest in such
money or property, passing from the deemed transferor to the next
present. "For example, if a trust provided income to the child for life, then to the
grandchild for life, with remainder to the great grandchild, and the grandchild was the
first to die, there would not be a taxable termination because the grandchild never held
a present income interest in the trust." House Report, supra note 11, at 50. This clearly
is required since, if the underlying policy behind generation skipping trust taxation is
the equivalence of holding property outright and holding a substantial beneficial inter-
est, a mere future interest should not be subject to tax.
"I I.R.C. § 2613(b)(2)(A), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2006(a)). In a
"sprinkling" trust, the use'of the class measurement of termination is reasonable and
proper, since it is not until termination that the beneficiaries can value their interests.
For example, if a beneficiary shares the right to discretionary distributions with two
other beneficiaries, it is possible that he or she may never receive anything or, alterna-
tively, may receive the entire corpus. House Report, supra note 11, at 50. This rule
does hold a potential for tax avoidance where the grantor makes a trust discretionary
to defer taxation of the interest of the beneficiaries he or she actually intends to receive
the corpus. The Treasury is expected to issue regulations looking through this type of
artifice to the real nature of the transaction. House Report, supra note 11, at 51.
2I I.R.C. § 2602(a)(1)(A), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2006(a)). This is nor-
mally the trustee, but may also be the deemed transferor.
21 I.R.C. § 2613(a), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2006(a)). The selection of trust
accounting income, rather than distributable net income or another measuring rod,
was merely an administrative convenience. House Report, supra note 11, at 52. Trust
accounting income is the income of the trust computed under state law and the trust
instrument. I.R.C. § 643(b).
"I Id. A similar device was used to prevent tax avoidance with respect to distribu-
tions of accumulated income by complex trusts. In the Revenue Act of 1942, Congress
attempted to curtail the tax-free distributions of trust corpus by complex trusts accu-
mulating ordinary income. It accomplished this by treating any distribution by a trust
having both income and corpus as a distribution of income. Int. Rev. Code of 1939 §
263(d)(3).
2,5 House Report, supra note 11, at 53; Senate Report, supra note 13, at 20.
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generation beneficiary, adjusted for certain deductions and credits.2 16
The tax base is adjusted for any portion of the deemed transferor's
unified transfer tax credit available at the time of transfer,217 the
charitable deduction, when part of the interest passes to a charitable
organization, 21 the credit for previously taxed property,29 the credit
for state death taxes to the extent levied on the generation skipping
transfer,no and the estate and administration expenses of the deemed
transferor.
2 21
The marital deduction may also play an important part in com-
puting tax on the generation skipping transfer. If the transfer occurs
within three years and nine months of the death of the deemed trans-
feror, the value of the property in the transfer is included in the estate
of the deemed transferor for purposes of computing the marital de-
duction.n2 This will usually raise the marital deduction, lowering the
total taxable estate and the taxes paid on the generation skipping
transfer itself.
The carryover basis at date of death, discussed earlier,23 will also
apply to property received under the generation skipping transfer.
The basis of property received in such a transfer is carried over from
the decedent-deemed transferor, although the "fresh start" of De-
cember 31, 1976, is available. 24 The basis is increased, though not
223 I.R.C. § 2602(a), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2006(a)); House Report, supra
note 11, at 54-55; Senate Report, supra note 13, at 20-21.
"7 I.R.C. § 2602(c)(3), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2006(a)); House Report,
supra note 11, at 54.
2I I.R.C. § 2602(c)(2), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2006(a)); House Report,
supra note .11, at 54. Of course, the charitable. organization receiving the property
interest must be one meeting the qualifications of section 2055 of the Code, dealing
with the estate tax deduction for charitable contributions.
21, I.R.C. § 2602(c)(4), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2006(a)); House Report,
supra note 11, at 54. Under the provisions of current law dealing with the credit for
previously taxed properties, an estate may receive a credit against tax liability for up
to eighty percent of the toxes paid on property included in the gross estate of another
decedent within the past 10 years. I.R.C. § 2013. This may be of importance to both
younger generation beneficiaries who will get a credit for prior generation skipping
transfer taxes and also to the deemed transferor whose estate may be comprised of
recently inherited property, so as to lower the marginal tax rate on the generation
skipping transfer.
1' I.R.C. § 2602(c)(5)(C), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2006(a)); House Report,
supra note 11, at 54-55.
22 I.R.C. § 2602(c)(5)(B), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2006(a)); House Report,
supra note 11, at 55.
2 I.R.C. § 2602(c)(5)(A), (added byAct, supra note 12, § 2006(a)); House Report,
supra note 11, at 54.
211 Id. at 30-40.
2m I.R.C. § 2614, (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2006(a)); Conference Report,
supra note 13, at 614.
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above its fair market value for purposes of the generation skipping
tax, by the tax imposed. The trust is not eligible for either the $60,000
or $10,000 exclusions.m
The parent of the transferee of the generation skipping transfer
most closely related to the grantor of the trust will normally be the
deemed transferor. 6 If that parent is not a younger generation bene-
ficiary at any time and if there is another ancestor of the transferee
who is a younger generation beneficiary of the grantor, such other
ancestor will be the deemed transferor.m If the interest passes to an
individual outside the family of the grantor, the deemed transferor
will be the parent of the transferee having the closest "affinity" to
the grantor, by relationship or age.
2
2
The principal difference between the House and Senate versions
of the generation skipping transfer tax was the specific exemption.
The law provides for a specific exemption from the generation skip-
ping transfer tax for each deemed transferee in the amount of
$250,000. However, the deemed transferee must be the grandchild of
the grantor.29 The House Committee on Ways and Means had origi-
nally proposed a $1 million per grandchild exemption, and the Senate
had proposed no exemption. The $250,000 per grandchild exemption
was a compromise between the two proposals.
The generation skipping transfer tax is computed on the marginal
rates of the deemed ransferor but he or she is not liable for its pay-
ment. The tax is to be paid out of the proceeds of the trust property.21
If there is a taxable distribution of trust property, the distributee is
personally liable for the tax up to the amount of the distribution .
2
Otherwise, only the trustee is liable for payment of the tax. m In
sId.
n' I.R.C. § 2612, (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2006(a)); House Report, supra
note 11, at 56.
r Id.
m Id.; see id. at 69 n.206, delineating the degrees of "affinity" by relative ages.
= I.R.C. § 2613(b)(6), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2006(a)); see Conference
Report, supra note 13, at 614. The Treasury Department will issue regulations to devise
a "separate share" rule, noting when multiple interests should be treated as a single
item for purposes of the generation skipping trust tax exemption.
= Id.
n' I.R.C. § 2601, (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2006(a)); House Report, supra
note 11, at 57-58.
m I.R.C. § 2603(a)(3), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2006(a)); House Report,
supra note 11, at 58.
2 I.R.C. § 2603(a)(1), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2006(a)); House Report,
supra note 11, at 57. The trustee is also required to file the trust's generation skipping
trust tax return, at which time, if appropriate, he or she may elect the alternate
valuation date. Conference Report, supra note 13, at 615.
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consideration of the liability of the trustee, he or she may file with
the Department of the Treasury a written request for information on
the rate bracket of the transferor and the remaining portion of the
trust's per-grandchild, $250,000 exclusion. The trustee is not liable
for taxes resulting from erroneous information provided by the De-
partment of the Treasury.
The new law will generally apply to generation skipping transfers
occurring after April 30, 1976.2 However, the law will apply to nei-
ther irrevocable inter vivos trusts existing on April 30, 1976, nor re-
vocable trusts and wills in existence on that date, where the decedent
dies before January 1, 1982, without revoking or amending the instru-
ment. 8 In the case of a decedent who was incompetent to alter or
amend his or her instrument on April 30, 1976, the effective date is
extended to two years after removal of the disability.
7
The principal objection which may be raised against the genera-
tion skipping trust tax is its extreme complexity. Part of the complex-
ity is ascribable to the complex nature of the estate planning tech-
niques being dealt with. It is unreasonable for an estate planner to
claim immunity from tax revision because of the complexity of his
or her planning devices. To this extent, therefore, the new rules
should not be highly faulted. 8
Part of the complexity of the new rules could have been avoided
through greater reliance upon certain other proposals. The American
Law Institute's proposals would have excluded from the new rules
any trust skipping only one generation. 9 They reasoned that the
complexity involved in curing the tax inequity arising from a single-
generation skipping transfer was sufficient to outweigh the inequity
itself.40 Another proposal has been made that the generation skip-
ping trust problem be addressed through positive legislation encour-
aging outright transfers. The suggestion was that a "parental deduc-
tion" be granted the estate of a decedent for 40 percent of the value
of property transferred outright to a child. The proposal reasoned
that the reduction in taxes on the grantor's estate would discourage
= Id.
2 Act § 2206(c).
2U Id.
= Id.
2m Hearings on Revision of the Federal Estate Tax Law Before the Senate Finance
Committee, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 179 (1976) (statement of Stanley S. Surrey).
23 ALI Proposals, supra note 27, at 28-29.
248 Id.
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the use of generation skipping transfers, which would not qualify for
the deduction. " '
A third approach was the so-called accessions tax, which would
have imposed a tax on the recipient of property transferred by gift or
testamentary disposition, graduated by the transfers received, rather
than those made.2 ' This would be in substitution for the basic estate
and gift tax structure currently employed. The accessions tax would
determine the liability when the funds reached the recipient, not
when the interests were created in an uncertain form. This provision
was promoted as a solution to the generation skipping trust problem,
because it requires no immediate identification of the recipients and
interests to be taxed and because the incremental growth of the assets
transferred during the period when taxes were deferred, would in-
crease the tax when the asset was received, discouraging deferral. 43
In addition to the suggested complexity of the new generation
skipping trust rules, there have also been raised questions regarding
the conceptual soundness of the tax's philosophical bases. One com-
mentator notes that the tax treats as equivalent to absolute owner-
ship of property, certain bundles of rights which are not so equiva-
lent. " While it is not difficult to perceive certain compositions of
rights which could be sufficiently similar to ownership as to be
equated therewith, simple income interests or limited corpus rights
do not appear sufficiently like ownership to be equated with it for tax
purposes." 5
Considering the conceptual problems and the complexity of the
provisions on generation skipping trust taxation, it is arguable that
Congress should have given greater consideration to some of the alter-
native proposals. The accessions tax is a dramatic departure from our
conceptions of an estate tax and, rather expectedly, should be viewed
with some skepticism. However, the American Law Institute's pro-
"' Westfall, supra note 194, at 1012-13; see 1973 Panel Discussions, supra note
10, at 1552 (statement of Richard Covey); Hearings on Federal Estate and Gift Taxes
Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 155 (1976)
(discussion draft on Transfer Taxes by the American Bankers' Association).
22 This tax was promoted as a proposal of the American Law Institute in 1968.
ALI Proposals, supra note 27, at 446-589. See Andrews, The Accessions Tax Proposal,
22 TAx L. Rav. 589 (1969). The proposal has the support of the American Bar Associa-
tion's Section on Taxation. Hearings on Federal Estate and Gift Taxes Before the
House Committee on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1416 (1976)(statement of
Edward C. Halbach, Jr.) [hereinafter cited as ABA Statement].
24 ABA Statement, supra note 242, at 1417.
24 1973 Panel Discussions, supra note 10, at 1530-31 (statement of Bart A. Brown).
245 Id.
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posal to exempt from the generation skipping trust rules any trust
skipping only one generation, or the alternative proposal for a paren-
tal deduction, may have been worthy of far greater consideration and
possibly adoption.
Orphan's Exclusion
Various parts of the new estate and gift tax revision are based
upon interests of tax equity, revenue needs or technical corrections
of the law. The so-called "orphan's exclusion," however, has been
criticized as being supportive of none of these basic principles of
reform. These criticisms are not altogether unfounded.
The Department of the Treasury proposed, in 1969, that a special
deduction be provided for the parents' testamentary transfers to or-
phaned children. The Department contended that there was a "need
for special relief. . . when a decedent has no surviving spouse but
leaves minor children.""24 Under their proposal, an exclusion would
have been allowed an estate for transfers to orphaned minor children
of the decedent. The exclusion would have been $3,000 for each year
of the orphan's age below 21.247
The House Committee on Ways and Means proposed, and the
Congress adopted, the new exclusion almost without change from the
1969 proposals. Under the new provision, the exemption would apply
as described in 1969, but the amount would be increased to $5,000
for each year of the orphan's age below 21.A1
To qualify for the orphan's exclusion, the interest passing to the
minor child must be of a character which, if passing to a surviving
spouse, would qualify for the marital deduction." 9 The orphan's ex-
clusion is expected to lose only a negligible amount of revenue.,,
The exclusion has been criticized because it provides a substantial
" Treasury Proposals, supra note 21, at 30. While the Treasury did not so state
specifically, the proposal was probably derived from section 812 of the 1939 Code,
which provided an estate tax exemption for any amounts "reasonably required and
actually expended for the support during the settlement of the estate of those depen-
dent upon the decedent. . . ." Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 812 (repealed by Act of Sept.
23, 1950, § 502, 64 Stat. 959, 962).
247 Treasury Proposals, supra note 21, at 43.
24A I.R.C. § 2057, (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2007(a)).
2,9 I.R.C. § 2057(c), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2007(a)). This precludes from
qualification for the orphan's exclusion any terminable interest, including contingent
interests and life estates not coupled with a non-limited power of appointment.
2" STAFF OF THE JoINT COMMITrEE ON INTERNAL REvENuE TAXATION, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess., CONFEFENCE COMPARISON ON H.R. 10612, 112 (1976) (Comm. Print 1976).
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benefit to those estates not in need of it.21 While the exclusion ap-
pears predicatd upon an intention to aid the minor who inherits only
a moderate-sized estate, the entirety of which will be needed to sup-
port him or her, two defects make the impact deviate from the design.
First, a moderate-sized estate will probably stem from a middle-
class household, which will be unlikely ever to have made taxable
gifts. The $3,000 per donee annual exclusion will probably have cov-
ered all gifts made by such a family.7 2 Therefore, the unified transfer
tax credit will be intact and protect up to $175,000 of estate properties
from tax.23
Second, by failing to limit the exclusion to moderate estates, a
number of orphans of substantial means will receive the exemption.
An orphan receiving a $10 million bequest will not only receive the
exclusion but, because of the higher marginal estate tax rates of the
estate from which he benefits, receive a greater dollar value from the
same exemption.21
The orphan's exclusion is a grant of tax revenues to beneficiaries
who may or may not have a financial need for assistance of the public
fisc. Perhaps a better approach would have been to limit the exclu-
sion to the difference between the unified transfer tax credit available
against the estate and $100,000 of estate properties. This would assist
orphans whose parents depleted or exhausted their unified credits,
but would not permit excessive combined use of the two provisions.
In addition, the exclusion could be denied estates with adjusted gross
value in excess of $150,000, precluding the use of the exemption by
larger estates.
Thus, the orphan's exclusion may be faulted on some points, in-
cluding its failure to limit applicability to smaller estates. However,
where there are middle-sized estates passing to orphans who will need
these properties undiminished by estate taxes to support themselves
in future years, the provision may prove useful and a valid expendi-
ture of public revenues.
Administrative Provisions
The scope of the current estate and gift tax reform measures ex-
2"1 Hearings on Estate and Gift Taxes Before the House Committee on Ways and
Means, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1976)(Discussion Draft of Transfer Tax by the Ameri-
can Bankers' Association); ABA Statement, supra note 242, at 1413-14.
2 House Report, supra note 11, at 59.
2 I.R.C. § 2505, (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2001(a)).
I.R.C. § 2001, (amended by Act, supra note 12, § 2001(a)). The maximum rate
on an estate under the new tables is 70 percent on estates over $5 million in value.
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tends beyond the substantive revision of the tax laws to revision of
certain procedural matters relative to estate and gift taxes. The new
law contains three measures of procedural reform: a revision of the
provisions for contesting asset valuations, requirements on filing gift
tax returns, and indexing of estate tax liens.
(1) Furnishing of Statement Explaining Estate or Gift Tax
Valuations
While many tax planners concentrate their efforts on determining
which assets can be removed from the taxpayer's estate, of equal
importance in determining the level of estate and gift taxes is the
valuation placed on assets.3" While some assets are relatively simple
to value, such as securities or automobiles with "blue book" valua-
tions, others may be subject to significant variances in opinion, lead-
ing to many disputes with the Internal Revenue Service.
The fiduciary includes a listing of the assets of an estate and their
valuations as part of the estate tax return.2" The Internal Revenue
Service, of course, is free to contest any valuation placed by a fidu-
ciary on any asset of the estate. With regard to gift taxes as well, the
valuation placed on the gift is the key determinant of the amount of
tax imposed."' The tax return filed by a grantor includes an accurate
valuation of the asset, and the Internal Revenue Service may also
contest the valuation placed upon a gift.2"
When the Internal Revenue Service contests a valuation placed by
a fiduciary or grantor on a gift, the grantor or fiduciary is placed in a
difficult, defensive position. The determination of tax and valuation
of assets by the Internal Revenue Service has a presumption of cor-
rectness which, if challenged in court, the taxpayer must overcome.2
9
Furthermore, if the taxpayer does not desire to litigate, seeking in-
stead administrative review,2"1 the Service has not previously been
required to furnish any information regarding the mode of valuation
used by its agents.
LowNDEs, KRAMER & McCORD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFr TAXES 973 (3d ed.
1974).
Treas. Reg. § 20.6018-3(a)(1973).
27 I.R.C. § 2502.
Treas. Reg. § 20.6018-3(a)(1973).
5' Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933); Wickwire v. Reinecke, 275 U.S. 101
(1927).
168 The taxpayer may seek two levels of administrative appeal of an assessment
or a valuation. First, he or she may seek a conference in the District Director's Office,
Audit Division. Then an appeal may be taken to the Appellate Division of the District
Director's Office. See WHINERY, TAX PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 284 (1975).
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The Tax Reform Act of 1976 added a new provision to the estate
and gift tax procedures which will facilitate taxpayer challenges to
the valuations proposed by the Internal Revenue Service. Under the
new provisions, the Government must furnish the taxpayer, upon
written request of the grantor or executor, a written statement with
respect to the valuation of the asset it has proposed. " ' The statement
must be furnished within 45 days of the request or within 45 days of
the determination or proposed determination by the Service that a
deficiency is owing, whichever is later. 62
The new law also delineates the substance of the notice. The
notice must explain the basis upon which the valuation has been
made. Furthermore, it must include details of any computations used
in arriving at the valuation, and any expert appraisals used by the
Government. " 3 The burden of proof in valuation contests is not
changed by this requirement. It still remains with the taxpayer.' 4
However, this bill does attempt to provide the taxpayer with some
reasonable guidance in valuing his or her assets for purposes of estate
and gift taxes. The taxpayer is still free to contest the Service's valu-
ation and this notice is not binding upon the Government, so that it
may either fight for its valuation or settle the case. "
(2) Elimination of Certain Quarterly Gift Tax Returns
In 1970 the tax laws were changed to require quarterly, rather
than annual, filings of gift tax returns."6 Congress felt that the annual
filing requirements, which sometimes resulted in deferral of tax lia-
bility for as much as 15 1/2 months, produced too much tax avoid-
ance." 7 Therefore, the law was changed to require filing of a gift tax
return in any quarter in which there is a gift tax liability. 6 ' The
quarterly filing requirement has proven to be a major administrative
obstacle for the Internal Revenue Service, as well as for the gift tax-
"' I.R.C. § 7517(a), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2008(a)).
252 Id.
13 I.R.C. § 7517(b)(1), (2)(3), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2008(a)).
21 An exception to the general imposition of the burden of proof on the taxpayer
in tax cases is where, in the United States Tax Court, the Internal Revenue Service
increases a deficiency or asserts an affirmative defense. U.S.T.C. Rules, No. 39.
I.R.C. § 7517(c), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2008(a)).
"" Act of Dec. 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-614, § 102, 84 Stat. 1836.
24 S. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1970). As noted by the Senate
Finance Committee, if an individual made a taxable gift in January, 1970, and another
in April, 1970, the donor would have until April 15, 1971, to file gift tax returns on both
gifts and to pay the taxes.
2U I.R.C. § 6075.
ESTATE AND GIFT TAX REVISIONS '
payer."' Where a taxpayer has little gift tax liability in a given
quarter, a return must still be filed.
The new estate and gift tax revision includes some relief for both
the Internal Revenue Service and the gift taxpayer whose liabilities
may be moderate in any given quarter. Now, where the taxpayer has
less than $25,000 in taxable gifts for the entire year, no quarterly
return will be required. Only annual returns must be filed by taxpay-
ers with less than $25,000 in annual taxable gifts.
The change from quarterly filing to annual filing also produces an
ancillary change in the substantive tax law. The gift tax marital
deduction, which reduced the amount of certain interspousal gifts by
one-half,20 is limited to the amount of gifts exceeding the annual per-
donee exclusionY' Since 1970, this has been applied on a quarterly
basis rather than an annual basis, placing a premium on the amount
and timing of such gifts. 2 For example:
If, prior to the filing requirement changes, the donor made
separate gifts of $4,000 and $2,000 in different calendar quart-
ers of a year, no gift tax would be imposed with respect to those
gifts (total gifts of $6,000 less $3,000 for the marital deduction
and $3,000 for the annual exclusion). If the same amount of
gifts were given in different quarters under the quarterly filing
system, no gift tax would be imposed with respect to the $4,000
gift ($4,000 gift less $1,000 marital deduction and $3,000 an-
nual exclusion). The marital deduction is only $1,000 because
it is limited to the amount of gifts remaining after deduction
for the annual exclusion. However, for the subsequent quarter
in which the $2,000 gift is made, the donor would have been
treated as making $1,00.0 in taxable gifts ($2,000 gift less $1,000
9 Hearings on Federal Estate and Gift Taxes Before the House Committee on
Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 718 (1976) (statement of John M. Martin, for
the American College of Probate Counsel); House Report, supra note 11, at 62. The
Service was required to process 120,000 more gift tax returns for each year after 1970
than prior to 1970. House Report, supra note 11, at 62.
21 The estate and gift tax revision includes a change in the gift tax marital deduc-
tion, from a flat one-half of the gift to a total exclusion on gifts under $100,000, no
exclusion on gifts between $100,000 and $200,000, and one-half of all gifts above
$200,000. See text accompanying notes 63-68 supra.
"I I.R.C. §§ 2523-24. The regulations note that this rule, applicable to both the
marital deduction and charitable contributions deduction, permits deductions only
where the gift is included in the "total amount of gifts" made during the year. Treas.
Reg. § 25.2524-1 (1972).
2n Treas. Reg. § 25.2524-1 (1972)(Example 1)); House Report, supra note 11, at
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marital deduction and no amount of the exclusion is taken into
account since it has been used against the value of the gift
made in the preceding quarter). Thus, the donor's taxable gifts
for the year have been increased by $1,000 solely because of the
quarterly filing requirements.
The annual computation of gift tax liability for taxable gifts under
$25,000 per year will correct this situation because of the change in
basis of calculating the tax liability and return filings.
(3) Public Index of Tax Liens
The tax liens have not always been filed under procedures evoking
total taxpayer satisfaction. The tax liens must be filed in either a
state-designated location or with the clerk of the United States Dis-
trict Court in the district wherein the properties are located.24 These
liens, furthermore, take priority over most purchasers for value, hold-
ers of subsequent security interests, subsequent mechanics' lienors or
judgment creditors.
275
One of the more difficult problems comes from the lack of actual
notice required for the tax lien to be effective. If the lien is incorrectly
indexed by the local clerk or federal clerk, the lien is still valid and
takes priority over other interests as if it were clearly evidenced in the
record. However, an individual searching the chain of title could not
find the tax lien at all, and would have no notice of its existence.
Under the new provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the
Internal Revenue Service will be required to keep an index of all tax
liens at each District Director's office, and make a reasonable effort
to check the indexing of tax liens by other offices of the state and
federal courts, where the tax liens are filed therein. 6 The House
Committee on Ways and Means had proposed that the Service be
required to check all indexing by federal courts and local authorities,
but this was defeated in the Conference Committee, presumably
upon the belief that it imposed too great a burden on the Govern-
ment.
27
2 House Report, supra note 11, at 65.
2'1 I.R.C. § 6323(a), (b). Furthermore, notices of tax liens may be filed in the
United States District Court regardless of other state law lien filing places, as long as
the state does not designate a place for filing Federal liens. Rev. Proc. 71-37, 1971-2
C.B. 573.
275 Id.
275 I.R.C. § 6323(f), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2008(c)).
"I See House Report, supra note 12, 14844, § 9.
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Miscellaneous Provisions
In addition to the major, substantive provisions of estate and gift
tax revision, and the three administrative provisions, the Tax Reform
Act of 1976 also makes four additional changes in the substantive tax
law which were perceived as technical adjustments. Because they did
not fall into any of the major categories of estate and gift tax reform,
discussed heretofore, they are categorized as "miscellaneous provi-
sions." This does not, however, reflect a diminished importance, as
these provisions are among the most useful and interesting of the
entire reform package.
(1) Inclusion of Stock in Decedent's Estate Where Decedent
Retained Voting Rights
On occasion, a major judicial decision construing legislation is
viewed by Congress as either in conflict with the actual legislative
intent or in opposition to the perceived public interest.78 Such a
situation arose respecting United States v. Byrum.29 Acting to cor-
rect what it saw as an improper result, the House Committee on Ways
and Means proposed an amendment to the tax laws later adopted by
Congress which included in the estate of a decedent the value of any
stock transferred by him or her during life but over which voting
rights were retained.21
In Byrum, the decedent had established an irrevocable trust for
the benefit of his grandchildren and children. He transferred to the
trust shares of stock in three closely-held corporations which he had
controlled. Byrum designated a sole corporate trustee for the trust
and retained the power to remove the trustee and appoint another
corporate trustee at any time. He also retained the rights to vote the
shares, veto the sale or transfer of trust property, and veto any
changes in trust investments.2 1 At his death, the Commissioner de-
termined that the stock was includable in Byrum's estate because he
had retained powers constituting a general power of appointment.
2
Other examples of this same practice may be found in Code section 337, en-
acted as a result of Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945), and
United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950), and the grantor trust
rules, sections 671-678, enacted as a result of Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
1' 408 U.S. 125 (1972).
2 House Report, supra note 11, at 64-65.
21 408 U.S. at 127.
m Id. at 130-31. The Commissioner made this determination as an interpretation
of I.R.C. § 2036(a), which includes in the gross estate of any decedent the value of
property transferred by him or her prior to death but over which was retained a general
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The Governments principal rationale was that because Byrum
could control the corporation through possession of a majority of the
voting stock rights, he could control corporate dividend policy and,
thus, beneficial enjoyment of the stock.2 The Court, however, viewed
the power to elect directors of the corporation and, thereby, control
flow of income into the trust, as dissimilar to a control over the
enjoyment of the trust corpus and income.
Congress, not necessarily disagreeing with the Court's interpreta-
tion of the tax law, nevertheless did not want individuals to avoid
estate taxes on closely held corporate stock by transferring it away
with retained voting rights. Accepting the proposal of the House
Committee on Ways and Means,24 Congress amended the law to
characterize retention of voting rights in transferred stock as a reten-
tion of control over the beneficial enjoyment of the stock.
It should be noted, however, that the measure enacted to
"legislatively reverse" Byrum goes further than this simple goal. In
Byrum, the Government contended that because the decedent held
voting control over the corporations involved, he controlled the value
and enjoyment of the stock they issued. However, under the new
amendments, no matter how small the total corporate power the
transferor controls, the value of the stock will still be included in his
or her gross estate.
This amendment could be considered "overkill" by the Congress.
Some situations may arise where the transferor of a minority interest
in corporate stock will wish to retain voting rights in the shares trans-
ferred, but will be totally unable to control the dividend policy of the
corporation. Nonetheless, the transferor's estate will be increased by
the value of the stock transferred away. Such instances should pre-
sumably be few in number, and, the general import of the statutory
change will be to prevent some stock from being removed from the
estate of a decedent while voting control is retained.
Perhaps more significant is the framework of the newly unified
estate and gift tax structure in analyzing the anti-Byrum provision.
When Byrum was decided, the transferor of the shares was able to
power of appointment. The same provision defines a general power of appointment as
any lifetime right to the possession or enjoyment of the property or income, or the right
to designate who shall enjoy or possess the property or income. Consequently, the
Commissioner determined that the rights retained by Byrum constituted general pow-
ers of appointment.
408 U.S. at 138-44.
21 House Report, supra note 11, at 64-65.
m I.R.C. § 2036(a), (amended by Act, supra note 12, § 2009(a)).
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avoid taxes only because the gift tax rate was lower than the estate
tax rate, and he had an additional gift tax exemption. However, since
the two taxes are unified in rate and credit, it is advantageous for a
taxpayer to defer the taxes until death by making incomplete gifts
and gifts with a retained power of appointment.
Consequently, an individual, under the new anti-Byrum amend-
ment, could transfer away $250,000 of I.B.M. stock, retaining what
could not be considered by anyone a large portion of the voting con-
trol, and pay a reduced gift tax. Rather, the individual would defer
part of the transfer tax until date of death. For this reason, the anti-
Byrum provision may be somewhat ill-conceived and improperly
drafted. The Byrum fact situation should rarely arise after the unifi-
cation of the estate and gift tax, and the provision added to counter
the decision of the Supreme Court would appear unnecessary and
perhaps even harmful to tax equity and compliance.
(2) Disclaimers
Disclaimer legislation has been much needed in recent years, due
both to the impact of certain judicial decisions and the disunity of
applicable state law.26 The provisions on disclaimers, enacted as part
of the estate and gift tax revision of the Tax Reform Act of 1976,
provide an adequate answer to this need.
A disclaimer is a renunciation of an individual's interest in prop-
erty and may have both estate and gift tax implications. If an individ-
ual disclaims a gift, there is no valid transfer, and no tax is im-
posed.'" The disclaimer by a transferee of a testamentary disposition,
while not rendering the transfer non-taxable, may lower estate taxes
by increasing either the marital deduction or charitable deduction
available to the estate.m
Where the marital deduction has been improperly funded, for
example, a disclaimer may reduce estate taxes on either the dece-
dent's estate or that of the surviving spouse. Where the marital de-
duction has been underfunded, that is to say, where less property
passes to the surviving spouse than would pass without tax under the
marital deduction, a disclaimer of all or part of another beneficiary's
interest in favor of the surviving spouse may increase the marital
2" See Newman & Kalter, The Need for Disclaimer Legislation-An Analysis of
the Background and Current Law, 28 TAx LAW. 571 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Newman & Kalter].
2 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c).
21A I.R.C. § 2056(d)(2)(A). See Newman & Kalter, supra note 286, at 572-80;
LowNDEs, KRAMER & MCCORD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFr TAxEs 1013-16 (3d ed. 1974).
1977]
402 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIV
deduction and reduce total estate taxes."9 Where, on the other hand,
the marital deduction has been overfunded, that is to say, where more
than one-half of the adjusted gross estate passes to the surviving
spouse outright, a disclaimer of part of his or her interest will reduce
estate taxes when the surviving spouse dies."'
The disclaimer may also be used to reduce estate taxes in other
ways. A disclaimer of an interest by a beneficiary in favor of a charita-
ble beneficiary may help fully fund an underfunded charitable deduc-
tion. 9' In addition, while a release of a general power of appointment
is a taxable event, the disclaimer of such a power is not.9
Consequently, it becomes apparent that the ability to make an
effective disclaimer is crucial to post mortem estate planning. How-
ever, prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the law did not provide
either a definitive rule as to what constituted a disclaimer or any
rules of general application as to the impact of a disclaimer. The tax
consequences depended upon the treatment of the disclaimer under
local law. 23 Therefore, if a disclaimer was a valid renunciation of the
interest under local law, it was also valid for federal estate and gift
tax purposes. This rule has led to significant problems, as the laws
among the various states are divergent on the definition of a dis-
claimer.
21
Another problem in the interpretation of the law regarding use of
disclaimers in estate planning has been the time element. No other
rules exist as to when a disclaimer must be made to be effective other
than provisions of the estate tax law holding that disclaimers affect-
ing the marital or charitable deductions must be made before the due
date for the estate tax return.2 5 In this area the judicial gloss on the
law has hindered the lawyer's ability to plan for the impact of a
I I.R.C. § 2056(d)(2)(A), (amended by Act, supra note 12, § 2009(b)). The dis-
claimed interest is treated as if it passed directly to the surviving spouse, thereby
raising the marital deduction. I.R.C. § 2056(b).
m I.R.C. § 2056(d)(1), (amended by Act, supra note 12, § 2009(b)).
2' I.R.C. § 2055(a), (amended by Act, supra note 12, §§ 1307(d), 1313(b), 1902(a),
2009(b)).
"I I.R.C. §§ 2041(a)(2), 2514(b).
' Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c).
" Although the Commissioners of Uniform State Laws have proposed a Uniform
Disclaimer Act, this act has not been consistently adopted. The variances in state
disclaimer laws may be noted in the fact that only thirty-three states have statutory
provisions governing disclaimers. The other states rely upon judicial interpretations to
provide guidance in making renunciations, and these may vary even more than the
statutory provisions. See also Newman & Kalter, supra note 286, at 589-92.
"I I.R.C. §§ 2055(a), (amended by Act, supra note 12, §§ 1307(d), 1313(b),
1902(a), 2009(b)), 2056(d)(2), (amended by Act, supra note 12, § 2009(b)).
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disclaimer. In one decision, for example, a court held that while a
local court upheld the validity of a disclaimer for state purposes, this
was not dispositive for federal gift tax purposes. The court held that
a remainderman who disclaimed a known gift for 19 years had made
a disclaimer within a "reasonable" period because it was immedi-
ately after the termination of the intervening life estate.2 8 This type
of decision has led to much confusion in the tax profession regarding
how a disclaimer may be used.
In its 1968 study and proposals, the American Law Institute pro-
posed that disclaimers made within 15 months of the transfer, or six
months of the beneficiary's learning of the transfer, whichever came
later, would be valid. Furthermore, the disclaimant would have had
to exercise no control or dominion over the benefits from the transfer.-
In addition, a statutory definition of disclaimer was promoted. 7  '
The Department of the Treasury also set forth a proposal on dis-
claimers in 1969. Its proposal was substantially identical with that of
the American Law Institute, permitting the disclaimant to designate
only the decedent's spouse or a charity as recipient for the disclaimed
property. Absent a designation, the property would pass under local
law.2 8
The disclaimer provisions added by the Tax Reform Act of 1976
appear to have been influenced by the Treasury and American Law
Institute proposals. Under the new law, a single set of rules and
definitions governs the use of disclaimers in federal estate and gift tax
planning. A person making a qualified disclaimer will be ignored for
purposes of estate and gift taxes, and the law will apply as if the
interest had never been transferred to the disclaimant.2"1 A disclaimer
is "qualified" if it is (1) irrevocable and unqualified, (2) a refusal to
accept an interest in property, (3) in writing, (4) received by the
transferor or his legal representative, or the holder of legal title to the
disclaimed interest, not later than 9 months after the date on which
the transfer is made or the date on which the disclaimant turns 21
years of age, whichever is later, (5) the disclaimant has accepted no
benefits in the interest nor has he or she accepted the interest itself,
and (6) the interest passes to a person other than the disclaimant.m
2" Kienath v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973), rev'g 48 T.C. 352 (1972).
2" ALI Proposals, supra note 27, at 96-97.
2 Treasury Proposals, supra note 21, at 365-66.
21 I.R.C. § 2518(a), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2009(b)(1)).
I.R.C. § 2518(b), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2009(b)(1)). It is explained
that the time for disclaiming an interest in properties applies to each taxable transfer
individually, not to an aggregate of transfers. Therefore, if an individual is to receive
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Disclaimers are also permitted with regard to undivided portions of
an interest in property, validating the so-called "partial dis-
claimer." 0 '
As noted earlier, the disclaimer legislation included in the Tax
Reform Act of 1976, is much needed and sound legislation. While it
does little to expend or enhance current law on the subject of dis-
claimers, it does much to clarify the law and provide a firm basis for
estate planning with disclaimers.
(3) Changes Relating to Certain Retirement Benefits
Two problems regarding estate and gift tax treatment of retire-
ment benefits arose during the consideration of the Tax Reform Act
of 1976, and Congress addressed both in the miscellaneous provisions
of that act. The first deals with the exclusion for qualified retirement
benefits and its former inapplicability to individual retirement ac-
counts and retirement plans for self-employed individuals (H.R. 10
plans). The second deals with the gift tax treatment of certain retire-
ment benefits in community property states.
The estate and gift tax laws provide numerous benefits for quali-
fied retirement plan participants. The value of an annuity payable
from such a plan is excluded from the individual's gross estate, except
to the extent that the value is attributable to employee contribu-
tions." 2 Parallelling this provision, the exercise or nonexercise of an
option for a survivor's annuity in a qualified retirement plan is not
considered a gift, except to the extent of employee contributions.13
Neither of these tax benefits has previously been available for the
participants in an individual retirement account or self-employed
retirement plan.
During the hearings on estate and gift tax reform, the House Com-
mittee on Ways and Means heard testimony that these distinctions
in tax treatment constituted "severe inconsistencies and . . . in-
equities . . ." discriminating against H.R. 10 plans and individual
retirement accounts .3  Larger H.R. 10 plans, it was noted, were re-
a general power of appointment, and if he or she is over the age of 21 and other
requirements are met, the recipient has 9 months in which to disclaim the power, and
the individual to whom the power passes has another 9 months in which to disclaim
it. Conference Report, supra note 13, at 623-24.
5" I.R.C. § 2518(c), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2009(b)(1)).
" I.R.C. § 2039(c), (amended by Act, supra note 12, § 2009(c)).
3 I.R.C. § 2517, (amended by Act, supra note 12, § 2009(c)).
"I Hearings on Federal Estate and Gift Taxes Before the House Committee on
Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 781 (1976) (statement of William D. Brownie).
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quired to provide significant life insurance policies to fund the estate
taxes owing upon the death of the beneficiaries." 5 In answer to these
problems, the Committee suggested, and the Congress adopted, a
provision to equalize the estate and gift tax treatment of retirement
plans for corporate employees and other individuals.
Under the new provisions, the gross estate does not include the
value of an annuity received by a participant in either an H.R. 10
plan or individual retirement account, except to the extent of any
contributions which were not deductible to the participant."' Fur-
thermore, the distribution from an individual retirement account or
H.R. 10 plan is excluded whether or not it takes the form of a typical
commercial annuity, as long as it is an annuity."'
With respect to the gift tax treatment, a corresponding amend-
ment was made to exclude from treatment as taxable gifts, any elec-
tion of a survivor's annuity option in an individual retirement ac-
count or H.R. 10 plan, to the extent of contributions which were
deductible for income tax purposes.0
Another problem arose regarding the taxation of certain retire-
ment benefits in community property states. An Internal Revenue
Service ruling had held that, where a deceased spouse had a vested
interest in half of the annuity payable from an employee retirement
system, due to residence in a community property state, the interest
of the spouse was includable in his gross estate, without exclusion, if
he predeceased the participant-employee.0 Congress legislatively
overturned this ruling in 1972, providing that, to the extent the retire-
ment interest of an employee is attributable to employer contribu-
tions and, to the extent the predeceasing spouse's interest in that
benefit is only attributable to the state community property law, the
value of the annuity is excluded from his or her gross estate. '
In 1975, however, the Internal Revenue Service issued another
ruling, holding that the 1972 amendment had not changed the gift tax
treatment of these spousal interests in employee benefit rights.
Where an employee participating in a qualified retirement plan pre-
Id. at 782.
' Id.
3 I.R.C. § 2039(e), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2009(c)(1)). The rationale is
that the exclusion should apply wherever there may be a liquidity problem. Conference
Report, supra note 13, at 624. Where there has been a roll-over of benefits from another
plan, these too are excludable, although no deduction was available for them. House
Report, supra note 11, at 69.
" I.R.C. § 2517(a)(5), (added by Act, supra note 12, § 2009(c)(4)).
31 Rev. Rul. 67-278, 1967-2 C.B. 323.
310 Pub. L. No. 92-580, § 2, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
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deceases his or her spouse in a community property state, the surviv-
ing spouse is deemed to have made a gift to the other beneficiaries of
one-half of the retirement benefit.
3 1
1
Congress perceived this situation as one incident wherein they
had merely failed to alter legislatively the gift tax laws as well as the
estate tax laws. Acting to provide a gift tax exclusion for the value of
an employee annuity or benefit attributable to employer contribu-
tions, it has set two conditions for this treatment. First, the benefit
must be due to employer contributions under a qualified pension or
retirement plan, or deductible contributions under an H.R. 10 or
individual retirement account. Second, the amount involved cannot
be considered a non-tax deductible employee contribution.3 12 Where
these two conditions are met, there is a gift tax exclusion for the value
of the death benefits.
This amendment is clearly a technical change in the law inadvert-
ently omitted in earlier legislation. It also has the impact of equating
the gift tax treatment of an annuity, for gift tax purposes, in a com-
munity property state at the employee's death and at his or her
spouse's death.
31 1
(4) Income Tax Treatment of Certain Selling Expenses of Trusts
and Estates
The tax law generally attempts to preclude double deductions for
the same expenditure. Generally, an estate or trust is not allowed to
deduct any item for income tax purposes that is also deducted for
purposes of estate taxes, such as funeral expenses or administration
costs.3" However, in a number of judicial decisions, an exception has
been carved out of this general rule which Congress, as part of its
estate and gift tax revision, has seen fit to close.
A number of decisions have held recently that selling expenses
relative to property disposed of by an estate may be used both to
reduce the amount realized on the sale of the property, and as admin-
istration expenses for estate tax purposes.3 15 The rationale was ex-
plained in one of the earliest of the decisions:
3,, Rev. Rul. 75-240, 1975-1 C.B. 315.
31, I.R.C. § 2517(c), (amended by Act, supra note 12, § 2009(c)(5)).
3'1 House Report, supra note 11, at 70.
31 I.R.C. § 643(g).
311 Commerce Trust Co. v. United States, 438 F.2d 111 (8th Cir. 1971); Commis-
sioner v. Bray, Estate, 396 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1968); Kreher v. United States, 70-1
U.S.T.C. 9331 (D. Fla. 1970); Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Commissioner,
311 F. Supp. 670 (D. Md. 1970).
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It has long been the position of the Internal Revenue Service
that brokerage fees and other selling expenses paid by an indi-
vidual who is not a dealer in stocks or the fiduciary of an estate
in connection with the sale of securities. . . are to be used only
as an offset against selling price in an income tax return report-
ing the sale .... We agree with the petitioner that. . . the
longstanding distinction between offsets and true statutory
deductions . . . [is] available for living individual taxpayers
and fiduciaries of estates filing income tax returns . . . . It
would seem to be unfair to tax the estate on the date of death
value, with no deduction for selling expenses, and equally un-,
fair to deny the offset of selling expenses against selling price
in computing the estate's income tax."6
Faced with repeated judicial accord with the double deduction, the
Internal Revenue Service conceded in 1971.
3 17
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 provided Congress with a forum for
changing this double deduction. An amendment was made to pre-
clude taking a deduction in the form of an offset against sales price
for selling expenses.3 18 This would appear to be well within the scope
of Congress' tax policy role, as it is merely a redetermination of the
scope of a tax law the courts had viewed far less restrictively than
Congress apparently intended.
Conclusion
Tax reform is never an easy task because contradictory equities
must be balanced. Tax equity often begets complexity, and vice
versa. The resolution of this constant conflict is never simple.
The new estate and gift tax revision, contained in the Tax Reform
Act of 1976, is clearly an improvement over the sixty-year-old estate
and gift tax structure with which we have previously dealt. The uni-
fied estate and gift tax rate schedules, the unified transfer tax credit
and the carryover basis for property received by inheritance will pre-
clude a significant amount of distortion in natural disposition pat-
terns as was caused by the former tax framework.
The new marital deduction and higher total credit value will re-
lieve the tax burdens on all small- and moderate-sized estates, and
the special valuation provisions for farms and closely held businesses,
31, Estate of Bray, 46 T.C. 577, 580-83 (1966).
311 Rev. Rul. 71-173, 1971-1 C.B. 204, revoking Rev. Rul. 56-43, 1956-1 C.B. 210.
31, I.R.C. § 642(g), (amended by Act, supra note 12, § 2009(d)).
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as well as the special deferral of tax payment provisions, will ease
some particularly unfortunate and unfair tax burdens.
The new generation skipping trust provisions will clearly improve
the tax equity, precluding what could constitute a major device to
evade estate taxes. However, to effectuate this equity interest, sim-
plicity in administration had to be sacrificed. This provision is diffi-
cult to deal with and difficult to understand, and it is going to take
considerable efforts on the part of the estate and tax bars to acquire
competency in dealing with the new generation skipping trust rules.
Altogether, though, Congress should be commended for its revi-
sion of the estate and gift tax laws. The new laws will promote greater
tax equity and, for most taxpayers, greater ease in administration.
This is always a difficult combination to achieve, and Congress has
been successful in the enactment of the estate and gift tax revision
of the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
